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Introduction  
 
As terrorism prosecutions evolve to counter current threats, including aggressive 
online recruitment and incitement to extremist violence, new interest is emerging in risk 
reduction measures that can be implemented following convictions.  The sentencing, 
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Abstract 
This article explores existing underpinnings in the United States criminal justice 
system for post-conviction risk reduction measures in terrorism cases.  The 
purpose of these measures is to reduce the risk of future criminality by those 
already convicted of violent extremist offenses, thereby protecting public safety 
while also benefiting individuals and communities. Specifically, integrating 
specialized risk and needs assessments into terrorism cases at sentencing and 
during the corrections process constitutes one possible risk reduction measure.  
When administered to individuals convicted of providing material support or other 
terrorism-related offenses, rigorous evaluations can supply courts with 
information significant for sentencing and, when appropriate, structuring 
individualized rehabilitation approaches.  In addition to assessment tools, 
rehabilitation and reintegration programs constitute potential risk reduction 
measures.  Risk reduction programs would supplement and enhance, not replace, 
existing correctional methods including incarceration and supervised release.  The 
District of Minnesota federal court is pioneering a program of disengagement and 
deradicalization for terrorism defendants, and other courts likely will develop 
similar approaches.  However, appropriate judicial bodies have yet to adopt 
proactive roles in developing national policy guidance in this area. This article 
aims to further the discussion of reducing recidivism risk in terrorism cases by 
clarifying the legal and technical issues that would require resolution as 
prerequisites for the consideration and potential development of post-conviction 
programming. 
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incarceration, and post-release phases of the criminal justice process all present opportunities 
to incorporate risk reduction measures, sometimes known as programs for disengagement and 
deradicalization.  These approaches are not suitable for every case, and in terms of sentencing, 
may have the most plausible impact in prosecutions such as those based on material support 
for terrorism, where offenses are often non-violent and prosecutions are considered 
preemptive.  In instances in which the underlying crime is predominantly preparatory and 
causes little or no actual harm, the defendant’s level of continuing commitment to extremist 
violence in the future often acquires heightened significance at sentencing, especially when 
additional mitigating factors are present.  In more egregious cases, defendants’ crimes and 
culpability justify correspondingly lengthy prison terms under a retributive approach, and 
judges may grapple with fewer sentencing ambiguities. 
In the months and years ahead, growing numbers of individuals convicted of 
terrorism-related offenses will complete their sentences and be released into society.  
Contemplating the reentry of this population affects the sentences handed down by judges at 
the outset, but courts face challenges in evaluating rigorously and consistently defendants’ 
continuing propensities toward extremist violence.  The federal justice system lacks 
infrastructure not only to assess, but also to reduce, the risk of recidivism for violent extremist 
offenders.  This article discusses opportunities to prevent future violence after conviction, 
focusing on the potential role of specialized qualitative assessments at sentencing, as well as 
specialized rehabilitation and reintegration programs in prison and after release.  
Policymakers increasingly converge around the recognitions that military and law 
enforcement strategies are necessary but not sufficient to counter and prevent the spread of 
violent extremism, and that innovative, whole-of-society approaches should supplement 
traditional counterterrorism methods.  In addition to community-based prevention and 
targeted interventions before individuals commit crimes of violent extremism, programs also 
should encompass post-conviction measures for rehabilitation and reintegration of qualifying 
offenders.  While experts, judicial officials, and attorneys have observed the need for such 
programming, federal judicial bodies and agencies have not yet taken public action by 
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developing training, programming, or best practices.  To the extent these agencies are 
considering the immediate need for programming and guidance, their efforts lack 
transparency. 
Part I of this article provides a broad overview of charging, sentencing, and attendant 
challenges in recent terrorism cases, especially those prosecutions sounding in material 
support for terrorism. Part II focuses on the role of risk and needs assessments in the U.S. 
criminal justice system generally, and the potential contribution of such assessments in 
terrorism cases specifically. To provide context for the potential development of new 
initiatives in terrorism cases, Part II covers the existing background and usage of various 
types of assessments in the pre-trial, post-conviction, and sentencing contexts.  Part III 
includes a case study of recent prosecutions in the District Court of Minnesota of individuals 
who sought to join the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), illustrating how structured professional 
judgment assessments may provide especially useful information during the sentencing phase 
of material support trials, and discussing how this approach could be broadened within the 
federal court system. Federal agencies including the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Center, and Bureau of Prisons 
could take critical roles in promoting research and policies to support these efforts.  Finally, 
Part IV provides a broad-brush overview of the basis for, and current status of, programs for 
in-prison rehabilitation and post-release reintegration tailored specifically for those convicted 
of terrorism offenses. Discussions in Parts II, III, and IV touch upon the respective roles of 
individual district court judges, and judicial entities and agencies within the justice system.  
Policy experts increasingly note the need for infrastructure to counter violent extremism both 
in civil society and at various stages of the criminal justice process.  This article endeavors to 
further the conversation by clarifying the technical and legal foundations for such 
programming in the post-conviction realm. 
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I. Charging and Sentencing in Terrorism Cases 
 
 
Surveying the Legislative Landscape 
To evaluate sentencing in terrorism prosecutions, one must first determine which 
charges and convictions to include in the analysis.1  In addition to innumerable definitions of 
terrorism existing outside the legal realm, federal law defines terrorism in multiple ways for a 
range of purposes.2  In every case that factually appears linked to political or extremist 
violence, prosecutors decide whether to pursue federal or state charges, or both, and under 
which specific laws to proceed.3  Statutes expressly linked to terrorism provide the most 
appropriate prosecutorial tools in certain instances, while generally applicable criminal 
statutes – such as those pertaining to murder, firearms, conspiracy, racketeering, immigration 
fraud, false statements, or other criminal offenses – are preferred by prosecutors in others.4  
Even when defendants are convicted of crimes other than terrorism, judges at sentencing may 
still apply a terrorism enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (discussed 
infra), which stiffens penalties for crimes with a terrorism nexus.5   
                                                 
1  See Ari Shapiro, Just How Many Terrorists has the U.S. Convicted?, NPR (Feb. 11, 2010), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=123571858 (accessed: December 25, 2017) (citing David 
Burnham of Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse for the proposition that studies 
of terrorism convictions rely on subjective decisions about which cases to include and “[d]epending on how you 
count… you get different answers.”) 
2  Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many 
Grails, JOURNAL OF LEGISLATION, Vol. 30: Iss. 2, Article 3, 249 (May 1, 2004), 
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1127&context=jleg. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
3  See, e.g., Susan Hennessey, The Good Reasons to Not Charge All Terrorists With Terrorism, LAWFARE 
(Dec. 5, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/good-reasons-not-charge-all-terrorists-terrorism (accessed: 
December 25, 2017); Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, What’s Terrorism Got to Do With It?, FLA. ST. U. L. REV., 
811 (2012), http://ir.law.fsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=lr. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
4  See, e.g., Richard B. Zabel and James J. Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism 
Cases in the Federal Courts, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST 6 (May 2008), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf (accessed: December 25, 2017); Terrorist Trial Report 
Card: September 11, 2001-Septmeber 11, 2011, CENTER ON LAW AND SECURITY, NYU SCHOOL OF LAW, 
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/TTRC-Ten-Year-Issue.pdf. (accessed: December 
25, 2017) 
5  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2015); Christina Parajon Skinner, Punishing 
Crimes of Terror in Article III Courts, YALE LAW & POL. REVIEW, Vol. 31: Iss. 2, Article 3, 334-35 (2012). 
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To provide a general framework for considering sentencing in federal terrorism cases, 
the following overview first highlights a selection of prohibitions that relate overtly to 
terrorism.  Congress has passed key pieces of anti-terrorism legislation over the course of 
recent decades, including among others the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (AEDPA), following the Oklahoma City bombings, and the Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 
2001 (USA Patriot Act), passed after the 9/11 attacks.  Chapter 113B of the federal criminal 
code, entitled “Terrorism,” codifies many of the anti-terrorism provisions in United States 
law.6  For example, the terrorism chapter includes the material support laws, key prosecutorial 
devices in recent terrorism cases.  After considering the material support laws and other 
provisions in the terrorism chapter of the criminal code, the discussion below highlights some 
of the other statutes that prosecutors rely upon frequently in cases related to violent 
extremism, including general criminal law provisions.7  The section concludes by outlining 
the factors courts generally address in sentencing terrorism defendants. 
 
The Terrorism Chapter of the Federal Criminal Code 
 
The federal Criminal Code (Title 18 of the United States Code) contains some of the 
numerous definitions of terrorism in U.S. law.8  Within the terrorism chapter, 18 U.S.C. § 
2331 defines the terms “international terrorism” and “domestic terrorism.”9   Without 
                                                 
6  18 U.S.C. Ch. 113B: Terrorism, 
http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title18/part1/chapter113B&edition=prelim. (accessed: 
December 25, 2017) 
7  While a discussion of all terrorism-related federal laws in the U.S. exceeds the scope of this article, the 
discussion below highlights a selection of key provisions. 
8  See Perry, supra note 2, at 256. 
9  Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 2331 defines “international terrorism” as activities that: (A) involve violent 
acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal law of the U.S. or of any state, or that 
would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the U.S. or any state; (B) appear to be 
intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or 
kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., or transcend national 
boundaries in the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or 
coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.   The statute defines “domestic 
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designating conduct that meets these definitions as chargeable offenses per se,10 federal law 
references the definitions in several other statutory provisions.  For example, federal laws 
reference the Section 2331 definitions in: expanding warrant authority in terrorism 
investigations, rewarding the furnishing of information on terrorism, and removing liability 
protections for volunteers and teachers who engage in international terrorism while in the 
scope of volunteering or teaching.11  For conduct to amount to either international or domestic 
terrorism under Section 2331, it must incorporate an element of political intent.  Specifically, 
the activities at issue must appear to be intended: (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to 
affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.   
In the same chapter, Congress established extraterritorial jurisdiction when U.S. 
nationals are targets or victims of terrorism abroad.12  Section 2332 makes it a crime for a 
person overseas to kill, or attempt or conspire to kill, a U.S. national, or to engage in physical 
violence with the intent or result of causing serious bodily injury to a U.S. national.13   Section 
2332 also mandates a political motivation to substantiate the required terrorism nexus.  In 
order for the U.S. government to pursue the case, the Attorney General, or his or her highest 
ranking subordinate with responsibility for criminal prosecutions, must certify in writing his 
                                                                                                                                                        
terrorism” as activities that: (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of 
the U.S. or of any state; (B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government 
by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
U.S.   
10  While these definitions do not constitute standalone offenses, they have been incorporated into a variety 
of other statutory contexts affording broad liability-related implications.  See Hennessey, supra note 3; Perry, 
supra note 2, at 257.  
11  Perry, supra note 2, at 257; see also, How the USA PATRIOT Act Redefines “Domestic Terrorism,” 
ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/how-usa-patriot-act-redefines-domestic-terrorism. (accessed: December 25, 
2017) 
12  See 18 U.S.C. § 2332; Hennessy, supra note 3.   
13  18 U.S.C. § 2332; Offices of the United States Attorneys, Terrorist Acts Abroad Against U.S. Nationals 
(18 U.S.C. 2332), CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-12-
terrorist-acts-abroad-against-us-nationals-18-usc-2332. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
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or her judgment that that the offense “was intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a 
government or civilian population.”14   
The terrorism chapter also defines the term, “federal crime of terrorism,” which holds 
particular significance at sentencing.15  The sentencing judge’s determination of whether an 
individual committed a federal crime of terrorism, based upon a preponderance of the 
evidence standard, determines whether the judge will apply the terrorism enhancement under 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (see Part I, infra), potentially lengthening an offender’s 
sentence substantially. 16  The definition also impacts the scope of the Attorney General’s 
investigative authority, in that he or she “shall have primary investigative responsibility for all 
Federal crimes of terrorism.”17  To constitute a federal crime of terrorism, conduct must 
violate at least one of a list of statutory provisions, and must be “calculated to influence or 
affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against 
government conduct.”18  The enumerated predicate offenses relate to acts such as the 
destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities, violence at international airports, biological 
weapons, nuclear materials, weapons of mass destruction, and a long list of others.19  These 
enumerated crimes provide insight into what types of acts, when coupled with political intent, 
amount to terrorism from the perspective of the U.S. government.   
In contrast, other offenses encompassed within the federal terrorism laws do not 
require a political motivation.20  For example, Section 2332a criminalizes the act of using, or 
attempting, conspiring, or threatening to use, a weapon of mass destruction against a U.S. 
national while abroad, or by any person in the U.S. under specified circumstances.  And 
                                                 
14  18 U.S.C. § 2332(d). 
15  See 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). 
16  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4; Perry, supra note 2, at 258; George D. Brown, 
Punishing Terrorists: Congress, the Sentencing Commission, the Guidelines, and the Courts, CORNELL JOURNAL 
OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY, Vol.23:517, 534-35 (2014), 
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/JLPP/upload/Brown-final.pdf (accessed: December 25, 2017), 534-
35;  Wadie E. Said, Sentencing Terrorist Crimes, OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 75:3, 477 (2014), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2448361. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
17  18 U.S.C. § 2332b(f). 
18  18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A). 
19  18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). 
20  See Perry, supra note 2, at 255.   
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Section 2332b criminalizes acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries.  Individuals 
involved in conduct transcending national boundaries violate this provision if, among other 
things, they kill, kidnap, maim, or seriously assault any person within the U.S., or create a 
substantial risk of serious bodily injury by destroying property or structures within the U.S.  
Federal law criminalizes as terrorism several other acts, not discussed in detail here, without 
requiring political motivation.  Some of those acts include: financial transactions with 
countries supporting international terrorism (2332d), bombings of places of public use 
(2332f), certain acts related to missile systems designed to destroy aircraft (2332g) and 
radiological dispersal devices (2332h).  
 
The Material Support Provisions 
 
Also located within the terrorism chapter of the criminal code, the material support 
laws form a strategic centerpiece of the United States Government’s approach to prosecuting 
terrorists.21  Two key sections, 18 U.S.S. §§ 2339A and 2339B, criminalize the provision of 
“material support or resources” for terrorists and acts of terrorism.  Congress has defined 
material support or resources for the purpose of both statutes to include, among other things:  
property, services, money, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false 
documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel, and transportation.22  The penalties for violating Sections 
2339A and 2339B are, respectively, a maximum of 15 or 20 years imprisonment for each 
                                                 
21  See, e.g., Andrew Peterson, Addressing Tomorrow’s Terrorists, JOURNAL OF NAT’L SECURITY LAW & 
POLICY, Vol. 2:297, 298 (2008), http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/peterson-finalpageproofs-12-2-
08.pdf (accessed: December 25, 2017), (material support concept became the “centerpiece of the legal war on 
terrorism”); Kelly A. Berkell, Off-Ramp Opportunities in Material Support Cases, HARVARD NAT’L SECURITY 
JOURNAL, Vol.8, 21-23 (2017), http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/1.-Berkell.pdf. (accessed: 
December 25, 2017) 
22  See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1). 
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count, “and, if the death of any person results,” then a maximum of life imprisonment.  
Individuals who violate these sections also may incur monetary fines of up to $250,000.23  
Section 2339A sets forth criminal penalties for anyone who provides material support 
or resources intended for the preparation or carrying out of any crime enumerated therein.  
The list of underlying crimes, in turn, incorporates by reference all of the “federal crimes of 
terrorism” listed in Section 2332b.24  Section 2339B, another frequently charged material 
support provision,25 criminalizes the provision of material support to any Foreign Terrorist 
Organization (FTO) as designated by the Secretary of State.26  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
held that even non-violent conduct intended to further humanitarian goals – such as training 
group members on the use of international law to resolve disputes peacefully – can violate the 
material support laws if the actions assist an FTO.27  Foreign terrorist organizations “are so 
tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that 
conduct.”28  Joining or attempting to physically join and fight alongside a terrorist group, such 
as traveling to join ISIS in the conflict zone, constitutes the provision (or attempted provision) 
of personnel, and has been a frequently arising type of material support violation in recent 
years.29  By May 2017, prosecutors had charged material support violations of Section 2339B 
                                                 
23  18 U.S.C. §§  2339A, 2339B, 3571(b); see also Charles Doyle, Terrorist Material Support: An 
Overview of §18 U.S.C. 2339A and § 2339B, 9, 19-20 (Dec. 8, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41333.pdf. 
(accessed: December 25, 2017) 
24  Doyle, supra note 23, at 6; Charles Doyle, Material Support of Terrorists and Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations: Sunset Amendments in Brief, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (March 17, 2006), CRS-4, CRS-5, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS22222.pdf. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
25  See, e.g., Terrorist Trial Report Card, supra note 4, at 13; Sameer Ahmed, Is History Repeating Itself? 
Sentencing Young American Muslims in the War on Terror, YALE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 126, No. 5 (March 2017) 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/feature/is-history-repeating-itself-sentencing-young-american-muslims-in-the-
war-on-terror (“The material support statutes [18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B] are two of the more widely used 
tools in the War on Terror”). 
26  8 U.S.C. § 1189(a). 
27  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
28  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010); Berkell, supra note 21, at 24. 
29  Attempts by Americans to physically join ISIS appear to have peaked in 2015; thereafter, this type of 
material support offense declined in conjunction with ISIS’ loss of territory.  See Director Comey Remarks 
During May 11 ‘Pen and Pad’ Briefing with Reporters, FBI NAT’L PRESS OFFICE (May 11, 2016), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/director-comey-remarks-during-may-11-2018pen-and-
pad2019-briefing-with-reporters (accessed: December 25, 2017) (stating rate of American recruits traveling to 
fight with ISIS declined from about six to ten per month in the first half of 2015, to about one per month since 
August 2015); Paul Sonne, Flow of Fighters to Iraq, Syria to Join Islamic State Has Slowed, U.S. Says, WALL 
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in over 90 ISIS-related cases alone, far exceeding reliance on any other statute in ISIS-related 
cases.30   
Another provision, Section 2339, criminalizes the act of harboring or concealing any 
person whom the offender knows or reasonably believes to be a terrorist.31  The final two 
statutes in the terrorism Chapter, 18 U.S.C.  §§ 2339C and 2339D, respectively disallow 
fundraising for terrorism and receiving military-type training from a designated FTO.  These 
sections are related to the material support provisions described above, but are charged less 
frequently.32   
In the years after the 9/11 attacks, the material support laws increased dramatically in 
prominence, evolving from infrequently charged violations into core strategic tools.  
Prosecutors often apply these laws preemptively, as part of law enforcement’s increased 
orientation toward identifying terrorists early and preventing attacks before they occur.33  The 
Department of Justice has “shifted its focus from the prosecution of crimes already committed 
to the prevention of future terrorist acts.”34   The material support prohibitions encompass not 
                                                                                                                                                        
ST. J. (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/flow-of-fighters-to-iraq-syria-to-join-islamic-state-has-
slowed-u-s-says-1461701387 (accessed: December 25, 2017) (citing information from Air Force Maj. Gen. Peter 
Gersten that rate of foreign fighters traveling to join ISIS slowed from around 2,000 per month to 200 per 
month); see also Michael Isikoff, Steep Decline in U.S. Recruits to ISIS, FBI Chief James Comey Says, YAHOO 
NEWS (May 11, 2016), https://www.yahoo.com/news/steep-decline-in-us-recruits-to-isis-fbi-chief-
212138680.html (accessed: December 25, 2017). 
30  Statistical Analysis: ISIS Cases in the United States, 3/1/2014-5/8/2017, CENTER ON NATIONAL 
SECURITY AT FORDHAM LAW, 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55dc76f7e4b013c872183fea/t/591095c89de4bb0a23961069/14942591459
20/ISIS+Case+Update+5-8-2017.pdf. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
31  18 U.S.C. § 2339. 
32  In addition to the fundraising prohibition in Section 2339C, a number of other statutes operate in the 
realm of terrorist financing.  The International Emergency Powers Act’s, for example, disallows the provision of 
funds, services, or support to a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. § 
1701-1776).   
33  See, e.g., Zabel and Benjamin, supra note 4, at 17; Berkell, supra note 21, at 21, note 106. 
34  Peterson, supra note 21, at 302; see also, Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: 
Perspectives Derived from the (Early) Model Penal Code, JOURNAL OF NAT’L SECURITY LAW & POL., Vol.1:5, 
7, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/02_ABRAMS_MASTER.pdf (accessed: December 25, 2017)  
(the government often applies the material support laws in a preemptive manner, “as a basis for early 
intervention, a kind of criminal early-warning and preventive-enforcement device designed to nip the risk of 
terrorist activity in the bud”); Testimony of John Ashcroft before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 
25, 2001), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/testimony/2001/0925AttorneyGeneralJohnAshcroftTestimonybeforetheSenat
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only substantive violations, but also attempts and conspiracies to provide material support, 
thus enhancing their preemptive power.35  Even where the intended support is never actually 
provided, the penalties available for attempts and conspiracies are equal to those for 
substantive offenses (except that penalties increase if the death of any person results).   
Crimes prosecuted under the material support statutes span a broad range of severity in 
light of the inclusion of attempts and conspiracies along with substantive violations, as well as 
significant variations in the nature of support provided in different cases.  At the low end of 
the spectrum, infractions may include non-violent conduct that results in little or no benefit to 
any terrorist organization or act.36   For example, individual efforts to raise small amounts of 
money to contribute to an FTO, whether successful or not, would constitute material support 
violations.37  On the opposite end of the spectrum, material support violations may involve 
more direct links to violence, and more extensive cooperation with violent extremist 
individuals or groups.  In 2015, Haroon Aswat pled guilty to material support charges 
stemming from his participation in a plot to establish a terrorist training camp for Al Qaeda on 
rural property in Bly, Oregon.38  In another egregious example, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a 
                                                                                                                                                        
eCommitteeontheJudiciary.htm (accessed: December 25, 2017) (“We cannot wait for terrorists to strike to begin 
investigations and make arrests…. We must prevent first, prosecute second”).   
35  See Charles Doyle, Federal Conspiracy Law: A Brief Overview, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
11, note 87 (Jan. 20, 2016) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41223.pdf. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
36  See George D. Brown, Notes on a Terrorism Trial, 4 HARV. NAT. SEC. J., 1, 3 (2013) (“the problem is 
that the defendants found at one end of this spectrum will not have done all that much”), 
http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Vol-4-Brown-FINAL.pdf (accessed: December 25, 2017); 
Berkell, supra note 21, at 21-22. 
37  See Terrorist Trial Report Card, supra note 4, at 20 (referencing the act of raising $300 for Al Shabab 
as a material support violation); Indictment at 4, U.S. v. Hodzic, et al, 4:15-cr-00049 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 5, 
2015),https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Ramic%20Indictment.pdf (accessed: December 
25, 2017)  (alleging conspiracy to provide material support and resources including currency and monetary 
instruments and property); Seamus Hughes and Bennett Clifford, First He became an American – Then  He 
Joined ISIS, THE ATLANTIC, (May 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/amp/article/527622/ (accessed: 
December 25, 2017) (referencing cases in which community networks provided material support); U.S. 
Department of Justice, Fourteen Charged with Providing Material Support to Somalia-Based Terrorist 
Organization Al-Shabaab (Aug. 5, 2010),  https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fourteen-charged-providing-material-
support-somalia-based-terrorist-organization-al-shabaab (accessed: December 25, 2017) (announcing arrest of 
Hawo Mohamed Hassan, a 63 year-old Minnesota woman, and Amina Ali, then aged 33, for among other things, 
raising money for Al Shabaab through door-to-door solicitations in Somali communities in the U.S.   
38  U.S. Department of Justice, Terrorist Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison for Providing Material Support 
to Al Qaeda (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/terrorist-sentenced-20-years-prison-providing-
material-support-al-qaeda. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
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“sleeper” agent for Al Qaeda, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to provide material 
support to Al Qaeda.39  Al-Marri had attended terrorist training camps, researched the use of 
chemical weapons for maximum impact, taken direct instructions from Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed, and traveled to central Illinois the day before the 9/11 attacks to plan and prepare 
for future acts of terrorism within the United States.40   
When offenders have plotted to provide material support to ISIS by joining the terror 
group in the conflict zone, but failed to make it there, authorities have responded with varying 
degrees of aggressiveness.  Depending upon whether they perceive the conduct to be at the 
low or high end of the material support spectrum, law enforcement’s response has ranged 
from dropping the case entirely (i.e., deciding not to prosecute), to prosecution resulting in a 
prison sentence as long as thirty-five years, with many sentences falling in between.  In 2014, 
three teenage girls from Colorado who reportedly attempted to join ISIS in Syria were halted 
by German authorities in Frankfurt and sent back to Denver.  The FBI detained the girls 
briefly, and then released them to their families without charges.41  Similarly, another 
Colorado teen was stopped at Denver International Airport in 2014 while attempting travel to 
join ISIS in Syria.  Nineteen-year old Shannon Conley was charged, pleaded guilty to a 
material support charge, and was sentenced to four years in prison, three years of supervision, 
and 100 hours of community service.42  In a more recent case, prosecutors charged nine young 
men in Minnesota with conspiring to join ISIS, although they failed to do so.  Six conspirators 
pled guilty; the remaining three went to trial.  After all three were convicted at trial, 22-year 
old Guled Omar was sentenced to 35 years in prison, while Mohamed Farah and Abdirahman 
Daud, also 22, received 30-year sentences.  These cases are discussed in detail in Part IV, 
                                                 
39  U.S. Department of Justice, Ali Al-Marri Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to 
Al-Qaeda (April 30, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ali-al-marri-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-provide-
material-support-al-qaeda. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
40  See id.; David Andrew Weinberg, Former Al Qaeda Operative Freed, Sent Home to Qatar, LONG WAR 
JOURNAL (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/01/former_al_qaeda_oper.php. 
(accessed: December 25, 2017) 
41  Michael Daly, How ISIS’s Colorado Girls Were Caught, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 22, 2014), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/how-isiss-colorado-girls-were-caught. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
42  Kirk Mitchell, Arvada Teen Jihadist Wannabe Sentenced to Four Years in Prison, DENVER POST (Jan. 
23 2015), http://www.denverpost.com/2015/01/23/arvada-teen-jihadist-wannabe-sentenced-to-four-years-in-
prison/. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
  
 
 
 
 
Kelly Berkell: Risk Reduction in Terrorism Cases 
 
 
 
 
288 
infra.  For current purposes, it is sufficient to note that the penalties for attempting to join ISIS 
in Syria have ranged from non-existent (non-prosecution), to moderate prison sentences, to 
lengthy, decades-long prison sentences.   
The different results in outwardly similar cases of attempting to travel to join ISIS 
appear related to the presence or absence of mitigating factors (such as youth, cooperation 
with authorities, and others), and the sentencing judge’s view of whether the offender is likely 
to disengage from violent extremism.  District court judges have struggled to ascertain the 
extent of individuals’ commitments to violent extremist ideologies or groups.  
Notwithstanding general statutory guidance on sentencing considerations, judges benefit from 
little or no specific, official guidance on these highly fact-specific judgments about continuing 
commitments to violent extremism.43  Part II, infra, addresses how risk and needs assessments 
could assist judges in the sentencing process, by bringing to light additional information 
outside the scope of a general presentence investigation report.  
Judges cannot predict the future, nor does U.S. criminal law permit convictions or 
sentences for hypothetical future crimes.  Yet the material support laws are often applied 
preventively, to preempt the commission of more violent crimes in the future.  Judges and 
experts explain that assessing the offender’s commitment to violent extremism already plays a 
critical role in sentencing; and this is consistent with the utilitarian or consequentialist theory 
of sentencing.  Risk reduction measures therefore would not change the fundamental calculus 
that judges employ in sentencing, but would serve to make their analysis as systematic and 
evidence-based as possible.  Most material support convictions do not result in life 
imprisonment.  Offenders will continue to be released into society, bolstering the case for risk 
reduction measures during the corrections process. 
 
 
                                                 
43  See Joanna Baltes et al., Convicted Terrorists: Sentencing Considerations and Their Policy 
Implications, J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL., 352-53, 55-57 (2016), http://jnslp.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/Sentencing_Considerations_and_Their_Implications_on_Foreign_Policy_2.pdf 
(accessed: December 25, 2017) (remarks by Hon. Gerald Bruce Lee and Karen Greenberg); Berkell, supra note 
21, at 47. 
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Charging Trends in Terrorism Cases 
 
The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University 
reported on the lead charges in “terrorism-international matters” filed in U.S. district courts 
during the first nine months of FY 2016. 44   Material support and related charges, including 
concealing or harboring terrorists, topped the list with the most counts filed.  Other charges 
that TRAC ranked among the most frequent were: violations of the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. § 1705), control of arms exports and imports (22 U.S.C. § 
2778), conspiracy to kill/kidnap/maim a person or damage public property outside of the U.S. 
(18 U.S.C. § 956), conveying false information and hoaxes concerning specified subjects (18 
U.S.C. § 1038), engaging in interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of 
racketeering enterprises (18 US.C. § 1952), and engaging in prohibited acts relating to 
controlled substances (21 U.S.C. § 960).45   
In 2011, the Center on Law and Security at NYU School of Law (CLS) compiled a 
Terrorist Trial Report Card reviewing terrorism prosecutions over the previous ten-year 
period.46  The report listed the twenty-five most frequent charges in terrorism cases.  CLS 
found that the statute most frequently charged was 18 U.S.C. § 371, general criminal 
conspiracy.  Following that were the two primary material support statutes, 2339A and 
2339B, which were in turn followed by 18 U.S.C. § 1001, criminalizing certain false 
statements. Prosecutors in terrorism cases have also brought charges for money laundering, 
immigration violations, and other unlawful conduct.  According to data published more 
recently by The Intercept, fifty percent of federal terrorism defendants since the 9/11 attacks 
have been charged with material support violations (although the report does not specify 
                                                 
44  One in Five International Terrorism Prosecutions in Eastern Virginia, TRAC REPORTS (Aug. 8, 2016), 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/431/ (accessed: December 25, 2017); see also, Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse (About Us), TRAC, http://trac.syr.edu/aboutTRACgeneral.html. Terrorism charges are sometimes 
filed under state law.  This article focuses on the federal context, while state court prosecutions fall outside of its 
scope.   
45  See id. 
46  Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11, 2001 – September 11, 2011, supra note 4.   
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under which statutes), rendering material support charges the most common type by far filed 
in all federal terrorism cases. 47     
As of June 2017, prosecutors in the United States had charged 128 individuals with 
ISIS-related offenses.48  Accordingly, some recent reports have focused on charges pursued 
specifically in ISIS-related cases.  The Center on National Security at Fordham law found that 
as of June 30, 2016, material support charges far outranked any other type of charges in ISIS 
cases.  These were followed by charges for conspiracy to kill overseas (18 U.S.C. § 956).  
Other crimes, not specific to the terrorism context but charged with relative frequency in those 
cases, included weapons charges (18 U.S.C. §§ 922 and 924), false statements (18 U.S.C. § 
1001), and general conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371).49  
Some have advocated for the more frequent use of treason charges in terrorism 
cases.50  The crime of treason does constitute another possible charge in certain terrorism 
cases, but perhaps because of the difficulty of asserting it (i.e., proving treason requires 
testimony from two witnesses to the defendant’s performance of an “overt act,” or a 
confession in open court), prosecutors have relied upon it infrequently to date.51  
                                                 
47  See Trevor Aaronson and Margot Williams, Trial and Terror, THE INTERCEPT (data updated July 13, 
2017), https://trial-and-terror.theintercept.com/ (accessed: October 9, 2017) (addressing cases classified as 
international terrorism). 
48  GW Extremism Tracker: ISIS in America, GW PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM, 
https://extremism.gwu.edu/isis-america (accessed: December 25, 2017); see also Adam Goldman, Jia Lynn 
Yang, and John Muyskens, The Islamic State’s Suspected Inroads into America, WASHINGTON POST (July 6, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/isis-suspects/ (accessed: December 25, 2017) (listing 
111 individuals charged). 
49  Case by Case: ISIS Prosecutions in the United States 13 (March 1, 2014 – June 30, 2016), CENTER ON 
NATIONAL SECURITY AT FORDHAM LAW,
 https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55dc76f7e4b013c872183fea/t/577c5b43197aea832bd486c0/1467
767622315/ISIS+Report+-+Case+by+Case+-+July2016.pdf. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
50  See Amitai Etzioni, Charge American Terrorists with Treason, THE ATLANTIC (May 24, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/05/charge-american-terrorists-with-treason/276199/ 
(accessed: December 25, 2017); Lauren Prunty (ed. Megan McKee), Terrorism as Treason: US Citizens and 
Domestic Terror, JURIST: STUDENT COMMENTARY (Sept. 11, 2011), 
http://www.jurist.org/dateline/2011/09/lauren-prunty-domestic-terrorism-treason.php. (accessed: December 25, 
2017) 
51  U.S. Const., Article III, Sec. 3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleiii (accessed: December 
25, 2017) (“No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt 
act, or on confession in open court”); see Zabel and Benjamin, supra note 4, at 6; Post Staff Report, The Trouble 
with Prosecuting Treason, NEW YORK POST (May 5, 2010), http://nypost.com/2010/05/05/the-trouble-with-
prosecuting-treason/. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
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Sentencing Considerations for Terrorism-Related Convictions 
 
Following every conviction, judges consider several factors to determine an 
appropriate sentence.  In addition to penalties specified in the charging statute, such as 
minimum or maximum terms, courts consider seven factors set forth in the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 and codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553.  These mandatory considerations 
include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of 
the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence to be sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to 
reflect the four primary purposes of sentencing, i.e., retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the sentencing range established by 
the sentencing guidelines and the types of sentences available under the guidelines; (5) any 
pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission in effect at the time of 
sentencing; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated 
defendants; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.52  
Calculating the range established by the Sentencing Guidelines – the fourth required 
consideration under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 – is itself a complex and multi-step process.  The 
Guidelines range is not binding, but any district court judge who departs from it runs the risk 
of reversal.53   To calculate the Guidelines range, one must first determine the base offense 
level.  Some offense types are associated with “specific offense characteristics” that can 
increase or decrease the base offense level.  For example, if an offender brandishes a weapon 
during a robbery, the base offense level of 20 for robbery increases to 25, and if the firearm 
was discharged during the robbery, the level rises to 27.54   
 
                                                 
52  Federal Sentencing: The Basics, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 2 (2015), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-
surveys/miscellaneous/201510_fed-sentencing-basics.pdf (accessed: December 25, 2017); see also, 18 U.S.C. § 
3553; Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, United States v. Abdullahi Mohamud Yusuf, 0:15-cr-00049-MJD-FLN, 
Document 661, 8:24-25, 9:1-2 (Sept. 26, 2016); Berkell, supra note 21, at 47. 
53  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).  
54  An Overview of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1, 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/Overview_Federal_Sentencing_Guidelines.pdf. 
(accessed: December 25, 2017) 
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The court then considers any additional adjustments based on general aggravating and 
mitigating factors, which are common across offense types.  For example, if the offender 
obstructed justice, the offense level increases by two.55  On the other hand, if the judge 
determines that the offender accepted responsibility for the crime by pleading guilty or 
otherwise, the offender is eligible for a two-level decrease.  Further, if a defendant accepts 
responsibility and declares an intention to plead guilty in a timely manner, and the offense 
level is greater than 15, then the government may request an additional one-level reduction.56 
In an adjustment specific to terrorism-related cases, the judge determines whether to 
apply a terrorism enhancement in Section 3A1.4 of the Guidelines.  If employed, the 
enhancement increases the both the base offense level and the offender’s criminal history 
category, resulting in a substantial increase in the sentence.  In determining whether the 
enhancement applies, the judge employs a preponderance of the evidence standard to 
determine whether the offense “is a felony that involved, or was intended to promote, a 
federal crime of terrorism.”57  In turn, 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) defines a federal crime of 
terrorism as one that: (A) is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by 
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct; and (B) violates any one 
of a long list of specified statutes.  When applied, the enhancement increases the offense level 
by 12; if the result is less than 32, then the offense level is increased to 32.  The enhancement 
also imposes a Criminal History Category of VI, regardless of the offender’s actual criminal 
history or lack thereof. 
In addition to determining a final offense level, the judge also determines the 
offender’s criminal history category.  This measurement is determined by calculating criminal 
history points under the provisions of Chapter Four of the Sentencing Guidelines.  Consulting 
                                                 
55  Overview of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 54, at 2.  
56  Overview of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 54, at 2. 
57  See U.S. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4(a), supra note 5; Brown, supra note 16, at 
535; James P. McLoughlin Jr., Deconstructing United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 3A1.4: Sentencing 
Failure in Cases of Financial Support for Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 28 LAW & INEQ. 51 (2010), 58, 80. 
Some have argued, however, that the enhancement has effectively become mandatory because appellate courts 
tend to treat it as the norm in all terrorism cases.  See Brown, supra note 16, at 534-35.  
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the Sentencing Table, one can determine a final Guidelines sentencing range by finding the 
box on the grid where the offense level and criminal history category intersect. 
After the Guidelines range is determined, the court may consider grounds for a 
departure or variance from the applicable range.58  One common type of departure occurs 
when an offender provides substantial assistance to authorities in another investigation or 
prosecution.  In that situation, the government may make a motion pursuant to §5K1.1 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines for a downward departure.  Part K of Chapter 5 of the Sentencing 
Guidelines outlines additional reasons for upward and downward departures from the 
Guidelines range. 
In formulating a sentence, the court generally benefits from a presentence report (PSR) 
that calculates the relevant Guidelines range, as well as any bases for departure from that 
range.  A probation officer prepares the report based upon his or her presentence interview of 
the offender and an independent investigation.  Prior to the sentencing hearing, the probation 
officer submits the PSR and confidential sentencing recommendation to the court.  The 
defense and prosecution attorneys also receive copies of the PSR.59 
 
The Status of Terrorism Prosecutions in the United States 
 
Statistics for federal terrorism cases prosecuted since September 11, 2001, are not 
entirely consistent in light of the necessity of making subjective judgments about which cases 
to include, and the ever-evolving nature of the data as cases arise and progress.  The broad 
picture indicates that somewhere in the range of 800 people have been prosecuted for 
terrorism offenses,60 and federal courts have convicted more than 620 individuals on 
terrorism-related charges.61   Recent sources indicate that between 35262 and 40063 individuals 
                                                 
58  Federal Sentencing: The Basics, supra note 51, at 16. 
59  Federal Sentencing: The Basics, supra note 51, at 6. 
60  Aaronson and Williams, supra note 47.   
61  Trying Terror Suspects in Federal Courts, Fact Sheet, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (May 2017), 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/Trying-Terror-Suspects-In-Federal-Court.pdf. (accessed: 
December 25, 2017) 
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charged or convicted for terrorism-related offenses currently are in prison in the United 
States, and more generally that incarcerated individuals include “380 linked to international 
terrorism and 83 tied to domestic terrorism.”64  Releases of convicted offenders are set to 
continue apace over the coming years, with figures based on 2015 data indicating that 50 
“homegrown violent jihadists” were to be released between January 2017 and the end of 
2026.65  Yet another expert reported in March 2017 that “over 100 terrorist prisoners are due 
to be released over the next few years.”66 
Focusing on the narrower universe of terrorism cases with an ISIS connection, as of 
November 2017, 147 individuals had been charged in the U.S. with ISIS-related offenses 
since 2014, when such arrests began.67  The average age of these individuals at charging is 
28.68  Eighty-eight of the individuals have pleaded or been found guilty, and the average 
sentence length is 13.5 years.69  As of June 2016, 46 individuals had been convicted in ISIS-
related prosecutions, their average age was 26 (while the most common age among them was 
20) and the average prison sentence was 9.2 years.70  The relative youth of many of these 
defendants, coupled with their average sentence lengths, make clear that many defendants in 
terrorism cases will be released from prison before attaining middle age. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
62  Aaronson and Williams, supra note 47.   
63  Trying Terror Suspects in Federal Courts, supra note 61.  
64  Deb Riechmann, Should Springing of US Terrorism Convicts Alarm Americans? ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Aug. 6, 2017), https://apnews.com/0d08df6f540f4dc291314396534fcf31/Should-springing-of-US-terrorism-
convicts-alarm-Americans? (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
65  See Riechmann, supra note 64; see also, Statement of Jerome P. Bjelopera, Terror Inmates: Countering 
Violent Extremism in Prison and Beyond, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Figure 1 (Oct. 28, 2015 
Hearing), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20151028/104102/HHRG-114-HM05-Wstate-BjeloperaJ-
20151028.pdf. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
66  Eric Rosand, We Need to Prepare for the Inevitable: When Terrorists Leave Prison, TIME (March 28, 
2017), http://time.com/4715307/terrorists-get-out-of-prison/. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
67  GW Extremism Tracker: ISIS in America, PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM, GEORGE WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY (November 2017 Snapshot), https://extremism.gwu.edu/isis-america. (accessed: December 25, 
2017) 
68  GW Extremism Tracker: ISIS in America, supra note 67.   
69  GW Extremism Tracker: ISIS in America, supra note 67. 
70  Case by Case: ISIS Prosecution in the United States, CENTER ON NATIONAL SECURITY AT FORDHAM 
LAW (March 1, 2014-June 30, 2016), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55dc76f7e4b013c872183fea/t/577c5b43197aea832bd486c0/146776762231
5/ISIS+Report+-+Case+by+Case+-+July2016.pdf. (accessed: December 25, 2017)  
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II. The Use of Risk and Needs Assessments in Sentencing for Terrorism Offenses 
 
Risk and Needs Assessments in Federal Courts 
Reviewing the current roles of risk and needs assessments in the criminal justice 
system provides a useful backdrop against which to consider the potential role for new, 
specialized evaluations in terrorism cases.  The federal justice system has relied upon forms of 
predictive analysis for decades.71  Policy rationales supporting the use of risk and needs 
assessments include safeguarding the public, and allocating correctional resources for 
maximum beneficial impact.  Risk and needs assessments may inform decisions and 
recommendations by judicial officials, probation officers, and others, at various stages of the 
criminal process.  Before trial, assessments factor into determinations about the requirement 
and conditions of pretrial detention or supervision, including decisions about bail.  At 
sentencing, assessments can help courts evaluate the risk of recidivism as one factor affecting 
the length and type of sentence imposed; this sentencing application is considered more 
controversial, but is relied upon or recommended in some states.72  In the post-sentencing 
                                                 
71  Jonathan J. Wroblewski Letter to the Honorable Patti B. Saris, 3 (July 29, 2014), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-comment/20140729/DOJ.pdf. (accessed: 
December 25, 2017) 
72  See Jordan M. Hyatt and Steven L. Chanenson, The Use of Risk Assessment at Sentencing: Implications 
for Research and Policy, VILLANOVA LAW/PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH PAPER NO. 2017-1040 (Working Paper 
Series 193), 4-6 (Dec. 2016), 
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1201&context=wps (accessed: December 
25, 2017) (noting that Virginia was the first jurisdiction to systematically adopt at-sentencing risk assessment 
statewide, and that “[n]o single description can fully capture the diversity of approaches to at-sentencing risk 
assessment”); Nathan James, Risk and Needs Assessment in the Criminal Justice System, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE 14 (Oct. 13, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44087.pdf (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
(referencing research suggesting that best prospective use for assessments in sentencing would be to screen out 
low-risk offenders); see also, John Monahan and Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing, 
ANNUAL REV. OF CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY, 489, 496-497 (2016), http://risk-
resilience.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/journal-articles/files/annurev-clinpsy-021815-092945.pdf (accessed: 
December 25, 2017); Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, 
https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-justice/ (accessed: December 25, 2017); Anna Maria Barry-Jester, 
Ben Casselman, and Dana Goldstein, Should Prison Sentences Be based On Crimes That Haven’t Been 
Committed Yet? FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 4, 2015), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/prison-reform-risk-
assessment/.  
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phase, assessments can affect eligibility for rehabilitation programming, the structure of that 
programming, and decisions about supervised release.73 
Assessment tools may focus on risk factors, which increase an individual’s likelihood 
of offending, and/or protective factors, which can reduce this likelihood and provide pathways 
out of criminal behavior.74  While risk assessments predict and describe an individual’s 
likelihood of committing future crimes, needs assessments identify the individual’s 
criminogenic factors or characteristics that can be addressed to reduce the likelihood of 
recidivism through treatment and services.75  The risk-needs-responsivity (RNR) model has 
become a widely accepted paradigm in the United States,76 and incorporates the principles of: 
assessing risk and matching supervision and treatment levels to risk levels, addressing 
dynamic criminogenic needs, and providing treatment that is responsive to the offender’s 
abilities and learning style.77   
Assessments take different forms, including structured and unstructured approaches.  
Structured or actuarial risk assessment tools utilize research from the social sciences to help 
measure the likelihood of recidivism, employing statistical probabilities based on factors 
unique to each individual.78  Some risk factors are static and unchanging (e.g., age at the time 
of the offense, employment history, and prior criminal record) while other factors are dynamic 
and changeable (e.g., attitudes and associations).  More advanced instruments typically 
                                                 
73  See, e.g., James, supra note 72, at 4. 
74  See Risk Assessment Instruments Validated and Implemented In Correctional Settings in the United 
States: An Empirical Guide 6,  https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Risk-Instruments-
Guide.pdf (accessed: December 25, 2017) (drawn from Sarah L. Desmarais and Jay P. Singh, Risk Assessment 
Instruments Validated and Implemented in Correctional Settings in the United States (New York: Council of 
State Governments Justice Center, 2013), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Risk-
Assessment-Instruments-Validated-and-Implemented-in-Correctional-Settings-in-the-United-States.pdf). 
(accessed: December 25, 2017) 
https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Risk-Instruments-Guide.pdf (accessed: December 25, 
2017), 6. 
75  See, e.g., Risk/Needs Assessments for Youths, OJJDP LITERATURE REVIEW 1 (Jan. 2015), 
https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/RiskandNeeds.pdf. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
76  James, supra note 72, at Summary.   
77  See id. at 5-6; Pamela Casey, Roger Warren, Jennifer Elek, Using Offender Risk and Needs Assessment 
Information at Sentencing: Guidance for Courts from a National Working Group, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE 
COURTS 4-6 (2011), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/RNA%20Guide%20Final.ashx. 
(accessed: December 25, 2017) 
78  See, e.g., Barry-Jester, et al., supra note 72. 
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incorporate both static and dynamic factors.  Structured tools involve plugging variables into 
an algorithm that produces a conclusion about the offender’s risk level.79  In contrast, 
unstructured assessments rely heavily on clinical methods, affording maximum deference to 
the evaluator’s professional judgment.  The structured professional judgment approach falls in 
between those two poles, allowing evaluators to consider specific risk factors from the 
structured tool’s calculus while simultaneously employing their own professional judgment.80   
Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in using risk assessments at various 
stages of the criminal justice process.  In some ways, the increased use of these tools 
represents a return to past sentencing philosophies.  The U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal 
Division, has noted that a rehabilitative model of sentencing and corrections, based on 
predicting future behavior, “dominated sentencing and corrections policy in the U.S. until the 
late 20th Century.”81  In the 1970s and 80s, however, reformers’ emphasis shifted to truth-in-
sentencing, an effort to diminish unwarranted sentencing disparities and their discriminatory 
impacts, and ensure that sentences were based primarily on the crimes committed.82  The 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 established the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which in turn 
promulgated the federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987.83  Congress also passed laws 
imposing mandatory minimum sentences for certain crimes, including the Armed Career 
Criminal Act of 1984 and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, and the number of mandatory 
                                                 
79  See, e.g., Federal Probation Sharpens Tools for Detecting Violent Offenders, U.S. COURTS (Feb. 9, 
2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2017/02/09/federal-probation-sharpens-tools-detecting-violent-offenders 
(accessed: December 25, 2017); Julia Angwin, et al, Marchine Bias, PRO PUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. (accessed: December 
25, 2017) 
80  See Federal Probation Sharpens Tools for Detecting Violent Offenders, supra note 79; Desmarais, 
supra note 74, at 6.  
81  Wroblewski Letter, supra note 71, at 3.  
82  Id. at 4.   
83  See Paul J. Hofer, et al., Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing, UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMMISSION iv (Nov. 2004), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
projects-and-surveys/miscellaneous/15-year-study/15_year_study_full.pdf (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
(guidelines could not be fully implemented until after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 
361 (1989)). 
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minimum laws continued to increase thereafter.84  The Sentencing Guidelines were adopted to 
emphasize fairness, consistency, punishment, incapacitation, and deterrence in sentencing.85  
However, implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines was followed by an unprecedented 
upsurge in the U.S. prison population, while racial disparities in sentencing persisted and even 
increased.86  The total number of inmates under the Bureau of Prisons’ jurisdiction increased 
from roughly 25,000 in 1980 to over 205,000 in 2015.87   
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided U.S. v. Booker, finding that mandatory 
application of the Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by 
jury.  The Court excised the statutory provisions that made the Guidelines mandatory, and 
rendered the Guidelines advisory instead.88  As the tide shifts away from the sentencing 
reform movement of the 1980s and its emphasis on incarceration over rehabilitation, 
practitioners and policymakers are seeking a more outcome-directed model.89  The resurgent 
                                                 
84  See Evan Bernick and Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering Mandatory Minimum Sentences: The 
Arguments for and Against Potential Reforms, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 2 (Feb. 10, 2014), 
http://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/reconsidering-mandatory-minimum-sentences-the-arguments-
and-against (accessed: December 25, 2017); see also, Quick Facts: Mandatory Minimum Penalties, U.S. 
SENTENCING COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-
facts/Quick_Facts_Mand_Mins_FY14.pdf. (accessed: December 25, 2017)   
85  The Impact of United States v. Booker on Federal Sentencing, Fact Sheet, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
(March 15, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/docs/United_States_v_Booker_Fact_Sheet.pdf (accessed: 
December 25, 2017); see also, Hofer, supra note 83, at iv.   
86  See Bernick supra note 84, at 1; Hofer, supra note 83, at 115-17.  Although racial disparities in 
sentencing have been well-documented and persistent, the relationship of those disparities with the Sentencing 
Guidelines is less clear.  One study by the U.S. Sentencing Commission found that racial disparities increased 
after the Supreme Court’s Booker decision rendered the Guidelines only advisory, but other sources dispute this.  
See Sonja B. Starr and M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity, Assessing the Role of 
Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, YALE LAW JOURNAL 2 (2013), 
http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2497&context=articles (“Contrary to other studies 
(and in particular, the dramatic recent claims of the U.S. Sentencing Commission), we find no evidence that 
racial disparity has increased since Booker, much less because of Booker”).  
87  Nathan James, The Federal Prison Population Buildup: Options for Congress, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE 1 (May 20, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf. (accessed: December 25, 2017)  
88             See Booker, 543 U.S. 220; Final Report on the Impact of United States v. Booker on Federal 
Sentencing, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION iv (March 2006), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/submissions/200603-
booker/Booker_Report.pdf. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
89  See Eric Holder, Remarks at the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 57th Annual 
Meeting and 13th State Criminal Justice Network Conference (Aug. 1, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-national-association-criminal-defense-
lawyers-57th. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
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interest in risk assessment in the corrections process in recent years derives in part from a 
growing demand to reduce prison populations and utilize budgetary resources more 
efficiently.  Advocates perceive reliance on risk assessments in sentencing as one step toward 
unwinding mass incarceration in the U.S. without simultaneously jeopardizing the historically 
low national crime rate.90   
The growing reliance on risk assessments also reflects a trend emphasizing data-driven 
analytics and evidence-based policies across professions.91  Former Attorney General Eric 
Holder noted in a 2014 speech: 
 
Over the past decade, we’ve seen an explosion in the practice of using aggregate data 
to observe trends and anticipate outcomes.  In fields ranging from professional sports, 
to marketing, to medicine; from genomics to agriculture; from banking to criminal 
justice, this increased reliance on empirical data has the potential to transform entire 
industries – and, in the process, countless lives – depending on how this data is 
harnessed and put to use…. It’s increasingly clear that, in the context of directing law 
enforcement resources and improving reentry programs, intensive analysis and data-
driven solutions can help us achieve significant successes while reducing costs.92 
 
Notwithstanding the trend toward evidence-based assessments, critics have raised significant 
concerns.  When assessments are based on static and unchangeable factors in an individual’s 
background, they may result in sentences that exacerbate racial disparities in criminal 
justice.93  Additional concerns relate to fundamental fairness, and the goal of ensuring that 
sentencing decisions are based on the crimes and culpability of the individual offender, rather 
                                                 
90  See Monahan and Skeem, supra note 72, at 491. 
91  See Holder, supra note 89; Wroblewski, supra note 71, at 2. 
92  See Holder, supra note 89.  
93  See Angwin, supra note 79.  
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than hypothetical future crimes and aggregate group statistics.94  As policymakers continue to 
study the benefits and drawbacks of reliance upon risk assessment instruments, they may 
reach different conclusions for various contexts and criminal offense types.  In the aggregate, 
terrorism offenders exhibit significant differences from other criminal offenders, and the 
factors considered predictive of the likelihood of recidivating are also different in the context 
of violent extremism.95  As a policy matter, terrorist incidents contrast with other crimes in 
their ability, at times, to profoundly impact society, and to exert far-reaching national security 
ramifications.  Accordingly, policymakers should specifically study the potential advantages 
and pitfalls of risk and needs assessments in the particular context of terrorism cases.  
 
Pre-Trial Assessments 
 
Pretrial risk assessment instruments have been developed and tested in various 
jurisdictions since at least the early 1960s,96 but actuarial risk assessments are relatively new 
to the federal pretrial services system.97  In the pretrial context, risk assessments address the 
likelihood that defendants will fail to appear in court, will present a danger to the community, 
or will be rearrested.  Assessing these factors helps judicial officers (i.e., judges, magistrates, 
commissioners, and hearing officers) determine whether individuals who have been arrested 
should be placed in detention or released into the community while awaiting trial.  If the 
judicial officer decides to release the defendant, he or she also determines the conditions (if 
                                                 
94  See, e.g., Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 Boston College Law Review 671, 675 (2015), 
http://digitalrepository.unm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1305&context=law_facultyscholarship. (accessed: 
December 25, 2017) 
95  See D. Elaine Pressman and John Flockton, Violent Extremist Risk Assessment, in PRISONS, TERRORISM 
AND EXTREMISM 124-25 (Andrew Silke ed., Routledge 2014) (noting that risk indicators used in the Violent 
Extremism Risk Assessment protocol (Version 2) (VERA-2), “differ fundamentally from the risk indicators used 
for non-ideologically motivated violent offenders”). 
96  See Cynthia A. Mamalian, State of the Science of Pretrial Risk Assessment, PRETRIAL JUSTICE 
INSTITUTE 7 (March 2011), https://www.bja.gov/publications/pji_pretrialriskassessment.pdf. (accessed: 
December 25, 2017) 
97  Timothy P. Cadigan, James L. Johnson, and Christopher T. Lowenkamp, The Re-Validation of the 
Federal Pretrial Services Risk Assessment (PTRA), FEDERAL PROBATION 4 (September 2012) 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/annual-national-training-seminar/2014/PTRA_2012.pdf. 
(accessed: December 25, 2017) 
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any) for doing so.98  Conditions of release known as alternatives to detention include 
substance abuse testing and treatment, third-party custody, halfway house placement, location 
monitoring, and mental health treatment,99 but these conditions are not exhaustive.100  The 
federal system, as well as the District of Columbia and at least twenty-two states, authorize 
the use of pretrial preventive detention in some circumstances.101   
Pretrial risk assessments provide critical information to judicial officers as they make 
decisions concerning criminal defendants awaiting trial.  These officers are tasked with 
ensuring the defendant’s attendance at court proceedings and protecting the community, 
victims, and witnesses from possible further crimes, while imposing the least restrictive 
conditions under which it is practicable to hold the defendant.102  Judicial policy favors 
holding defendants before trial under the least restrictive conditions practicable in part 
because of the presumption of innocence inherent in American criminal law.103  Providing an 
additional, pragmatic justification for minimizing restrictions beyond those necessary for 
public safety, research demonstrates that “unnecessary alternatives to detention placed on 
low-risk federal defendants can and do hurt defendant outcomes by increasing their failure 
rates.”104   
The Pretrial Services Risk Assessment (PTRA) is an actuarial instrument for the 
federal system that provides a consistent and valid method of predicting risk of failure to 
                                                 
98  See Mamalian, supra note 96, at 4. 
99  Cadigan, supra note 97, at 4. 
100  Timothy P. Cadigan and Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Implementing Risk Assessment in the Federal 
Pretrial Services System, FEDERAL PROBATION 30 (Sept. 2011), https://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-
assessment/Implementing%20Risk%20Assessment%20in%20the%20Federal%20Pretrial%20Services%20Syste
m%20-%20Cadigan%20et%20al%202011.pdf (accessed: December 25, 2017) (“Typically, defendants who are 
released on supervision in the federal system are given a ‘laundry list’ of conditions”). 
101  Moving Beyond Money: A Primer on Bail Reform, CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM AT HARVARD 
LAW SCHOOL 25, footnote 210 (Oct. 2016) (referencing state statutes), 
http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/FINAL-Primer-on-Bail-Reform.pdf. (accessed: December 25, 2017)  
102  See Mamalian, supra note 96, at 13; ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Pretrial Release, AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCIATION, Part I (General Principles) (3d ed. 2007), 
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_pretrialrelease_t
oc.html (accessed: December 25, 2017); Moving Beyond Money, supra note 101, at 18 (“Pretrial decision-
making is always, at bottom, a process of risk assessment”). 
103  See Mamalian, supra note 96, at 13. 
104  Cadigan, supra note 97, at 5 (discussing research by VanNostrand and Keebler ); see also, Mamalian, 
supra note 96, at 10 (referencing 2009 VanNostrand and Keebler study). 
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appear, new criminal arrest, and technical violations that lead to revocation while on pretrial 
release.105  As of September 2011, the tool had been implemented nationally in 93 federal 
districts.106  The PTRA also can be used to identify higher risk defendants for enhanced 
services, and to conserve resources by reducing services to low risk defendants.107  According 
to a 2011 report by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the six most common validated pretrial 
risk factors identified in studies over the preceding decade included: prior failure to appear in 
court, prior convictions, the present charge constituting a felony, being unemployed, history 
of drug abuse, and having a pending case.108  Yet predictive items identified in pretrial 
services risk assessment research change over time, and should be re-validated on an ongoing 
basis to ensure their integrity and effectiveness.109  In a September 2012 article concerning the 
revalidation of the PTRA, experts identified a need for the addition of dynamic factors, in 
order to provide officers with a tool to monitor and reassess risk in a standardized way to 
ensure that supervision and services are having the intended impacts.110   
 
Post-Conviction Assessments 
 
A primary purpose of post-conviction risk assessments is to reduce recidivism by 
implementing evidence-based practices.111  A 2015 study by the Administrative Office, 
Probation and Pretrial Services Office, suggested that increases in these efforts over recent 
years has proven beneficial, and the study documented a reduction in recidivism rates.  A 
report on this study in the Federal Probation Journal found that “despite the increase in risk of 
the federal post-conviction supervision population and several years of austere budgets, 
                                                 
105  See Cadigan, supra note 97, at 5; Cadigan, supra note 100, at 32. 
106  Cadigan, supra note 97, at 5; see also, Cadigan, supra note 100, at 33 (noting that national 
implementation was almost completed by August 2011).   
107  Cadigan, supra note 97, at 12  
108  Mamalian, supra note 96, at 9; see also Marie Van Nostrand and Gena Keebler, Pretrial Risk 
Assessment in the Federal Court, 73 FED. PROBATION 3 (2009) (discussing predictors of pretrial risk). 
109  See Cadigan, supra note 97, at 3-4. 
110  See id. at 12.   
111  See An Overview of the Federal Post Conviction Risk Assessment, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS, OFFICE OF PROBATION AND PRETRIAL SERVICES 1 (Sept. 2011), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/pcra_sep_2011_0.pdf. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
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probation officers are improving their abilities to manage risk and provide rehabilitative 
interventions.”  The report concluded that investments in evidence-based supervision 
practices and reinforcement of risk-need-responsivity principles may be “beginning to reap 
dividends in terms of community safety.”112  
The federal Post Conviction Risk Assessment (PCRA) is a scientifically-based 
instrument developed by the Administrative Office for the purpose of improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of post-conviction supervision.113  The history of the PCRA’s 
development sheds light on its utility for assessing offender risk and identifying challenges 
offenders face while under supervision.114  Criminal justice agencies began using actuarial 
risk assessment instruments for post-conviction supervision as early as 1923.115  By the 
1970s, federal probation officers used various statistical prediction tools to assist case 
managers in determining how much supervisory time and effort to devote to working with 
certain categories of offenders.116  In 1982, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) identified 
numerous probation or parole prediction instruments in the federal probation system, and 
evaluated the validity of four of them. 117  The FJC recommended the national implementation 
of one particular tool to assist officers in classifying probation caseloads.118  The 
Administrative Office tested, modified, and adopted this tool for system-wide use, renaming it 
the Risk Prediction Scale 80.  While the RPS-80 was in use for probation supervision, the 
U.S. Parole Commission’s Salient Factor Score (SFS) was in use for parole supervision.  
However, the Judicial Conference Committee on Criminal Law became concerned that the 
instruments were losing predictive accuracy.   
                                                 
112  Laura M. Baber, Inroads to Reducing Federal Recidivism, FED. PROBATION 8 (Dec. 2015), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/federal_probation_journal_dec_2015_0.pdf. (accessed: December 25, 
2017) 
113  An Overview of the Federal Post Conviction Risk Assessment, supra note 111, at 1.  
114  See generally, Jeremy Luallen, Sharmini Radakrishnan, William Rhodes, The Predictive Validity of the 
Post-Conviction Risk Assessment Among Federal Offenders, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR, 43: 9 
(Sept. 2016), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0093854816650481 (accessed: December 25, 2017).   
115  An Overview of the Federal Post Conviction Risk Assessment, supra note 111, at 4. 
116  See ibid. 
117  See ibid.  
118  See id. at 5. 
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Upon the Committee’s request in 1991, the FJC developed the Risk Prediction Index 
(RPI), to increase predictive accuracy.  This model was approved in 1997, and required to be 
implemented for all offenders at the beginning of supervision.  The RPI takes into account 
information about: the individual’s age at the start of supervision, prior arrests, use of a 
weapon in the instant offense, employment status, history of substance abuse, and whether the 
person ever absconded from supervision, obtained a college degree, and/or was living with a 
spouse and/or children at the start of supervision.119  A later review by IBM Business 
Consulting Services pointed to shortcomings in the RPI model, in that it did not adhere to the 
principles of risk, need, and responsivity.  The factors accounted for in the RPI model are 
static, and it does not enable officers to regularly assess dynamic factors that are associated 
with the risk of recidivism (i.e., antisocial attitudes and associates).     
The Administrative Office hired an expert, Christopher Lowenkamp, in 2009 to create 
an instrument with data specific to the federal probation system that adheres to the principles 
of risk, need, and responsivity.120   Lowenkamp and colleagues constructed and validated the 
federal Post-Conviction Risk Assessment.121  Researchers subsequently found that continuing 
to administer the PCRA during federal supervision can provide additional information about 
changes in the likelihood of recidivism.122  Researchers also have found that while the PCRA 
performs well for some offenses including drug, violent, and property offenses, it is not as 
reliable in predicting less common offenses.123   
The justice system has developed a system-wide infrastructure to standardize and 
increase the effectiveness of the PCRA.  Probation officers must attend in-person training and 
pass online certification tests before they can administer the assessment instrument.  In 2011, 
the Administrative Office reported that it was in the process of training all officers in the 
                                                 
119  See id. at 6. 
120  See id. at 8. 
121  Christopher T. Lowenkamp, et al., The Federal Post Conviction Risk Assessment (PCRA): A 
Construction and Validation Study, PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES, 10(1) (Feb. 2013), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23148771. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
122  See Thomas H. Cohen, Christopher T. Lowenkamp, and Scott W. VanBenschote, Does Change in Risk 
Matter? CRIMINOLOGY & PUBLIC POLICY 15:263-296 (Jan. 2016). 
123  See Luallen, note 114 supra.  
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federal probation system who supervise individuals convicted of a crime, with a 16-hour 
course that covers:  (1) principles of offender risk, needs, and responsivity; (2) PCRA scoring 
rules; (3) time to practice the PCRA on test cases; and (4) an examination of the relationship 
between the PCRA and the case plan.124  Staff from the Administrative Office teach the 
sessions with help from local district probation officers who are certified in administering the 
PCRA.  Officers must then complete an online certification process, and must recertify 
annually through a computer-based test.   
This model of training probation officers to administer the PCRA represents an 
existing infrastructure that perhaps could be leveraged, on a more limited scale, for 
specialized efforts to assess violent extremist offenders, whether for sentencing purposes or 
for post-conviction supervision.  The District Court of Minnesota hired independent expert 
Daniel Koehler of the German Institute for Radicalization and Deradicalization Studies to 
train its probation officers in administering disengagement and deradicalization evaluations 
(as discussed below). 125  Yet the trained officers will eventually leave their positions, and 
Minnesota is the only one of 94 federal districts to have implemented this program.  A more 
centralized and sustainable effort is warranted nationally.  
 
Assessments at Sentencing 
 
Considerations about an individual’s likelihood of reoffending have long factored into 
judges’ sentencing decisions, at least informally.126  One observer described sentencing as a 
“backward- and forward-looking enterprise,” which is “informed by an individual’s past 
conduct as well as by the criminal justice system’s prediction of the individual’s future 
                                                 
124  An Overview of the Federal Post Conviction Risk Assessment, supra note 111, at 14. 
125  Mr. Koehler is also the co-founder and editor of the instant publication.  
126  See Monahan and Skeem, supra note 72, at 490 (“Since shortly after the Civil War, many American 
states have relied on some inchoate notion of risk assessment in criminal sentencing”); Barry-Jester, Casselman, 
and Goldstein, supra note 72 (“Risk assessments have existed in various forms for a century, but over the past 
two decades, they have spread through the American justice system, driven by advances in social science”). 
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criminal conduct.”127  Indeed, the principles underlying risk assessment are, to an extent, 
implicit in the federal sentencing calculation under 18 U.S.C. § 3553, in particular the need 
for the sentence to “protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.”  Nonetheless, the 
use of risk assessment instruments to inform front-end sentencing in the federal system is less 
established than the use of such instruments in the pretrial and post-sentencing settings.   
In contrast to the federal system, some states have incorporated risk assessments into 
sentencing guidelines, designating them as one factor that judges may consider in determining 
appropriate sentences.128  For example, sentencing commissions in Virginia and Utah have 
developed systems whereby assessments factor into front-end sentencing; and following 
extensive study in Pennsylvania, that state’s sentencing commission is required by statute to 
adopt an actuarial risk assessment instrument to help determine appropriate sentences.129   The 
American Law Institute, in a draft of its Model Penal Code, directs sentencing commissions to 
develop actuarial instruments to estimate offenders’ risk and treatment needs, and encourages 
the use of these instruments to inform sentencing decisions.130   
Individual views about whether risk assessment instruments should play a role in 
front-end sentencing are informed by perceptions of the core purposes of sentencing itself.131  
The U.S. Sentencing Commission identifies the four principal purposes of sentencing as:  just 
punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.132  One approach focuses primarily 
on the retributive or deontological qualities of sentencing, emphasizing just punishment in 
                                                 
127  Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 671, 671 (2015), 
http://digitalrepository.unm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1305&context=law_facultyscholarship. (accessed: 
December 25, 2017) 
128  See Monahan and Skeem, supra note 72, at 495. 
129  See id. at 494-96; Mark H. Bergstrom, Sentence Risk Assessment Instrument Update, PENNSYLVANIA 
COMMISSION ON SENTENCING (December 2017), http://downloads.pbi.org/courses/9885/Bergstrom.pdf. 
(accessed: December 25, 2017) 
130  See Sidhu, supra note 127, at 674; Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific 
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STANFORD L. REV. 803, 815 (April 2014). 
131  See Andrew D. Leipold, Recidivism, Incapacitation, and Criminal Sentencing Policy, 3 U. OF ST. 
THOMAS LAW JOURNAL 536, 543 (2006), http://ir.stthomas.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1097&context=ustlj 
(accessed: December 25, 2017) (“t]he search for a limiting principle to imprisonment reveals that incapacitation 
and recidivism are two sides of the same coin”). 
132  An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, United States Sentencing Commission, 
http://isb.ussc.gov/files/USSC_Overview.pdf (accessed: December 25, 2017); see also, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 
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proportion to the offender’s culpability.  Assessing the risk of future crime is not relevant to 
sentencing decisions based “solely on backward-looking perceptions of blameworthiness.”133  
A contrasting approach, referred to as consequentialist or utilitarian, focuses on preventing 
future crime by the offender and other would-be offenders.  The sentence is structured to 
incapacitate (and in some cases, rehabilitate) the individual, protecting the public from his or 
her future crimes and deterring others from criminal acts.134  This utilitarian approach 
implicitly relies upon risk assessment and reduction strategies.135  Finally, the limiting 
retributivism approach represents a hybrid of the prior two approaches.  Risk assessment is 
relevant under a limiting retributivism approach, but has a limited impact:  even if classified 
as high risk, an offender cannot be sentenced to more time than he or she deserves for the 
crime committed.136   
Risk assessment has encountered resistance in the area of front-end sentencing.137  The 
federal Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, a bipartisan bill introduced in the 
U.S. Senate in October 2015, would have directed the Attorney General to develop and 
validate a postsentencing assessment of inmates’ risks and needs, but did not establish a role 
for risk assessment in front-end sentencing.138  Likewise, in describing the Federal Post 
Conviction Risk Assessment in 2011, the Office of Probation and Pretrial Services stated that 
the Administrative Office had “not fully examined the use of risk assessment tools for other 
purposes, such as sentencing.”139  One concern is that risk assessment tools could both 
reinforce and exacerbate existing racial and socioeconomic disparities, particularly to the 
extent that assessments are based on static factors in the offender’s background and factors 
                                                 
133  See Monahan and Skeem, supra note 72, at 492. 
134  See id. at 491-92. 
135  See id at 492-93.   
136  See id. at 493.  
137  See, e.g., Monahan and Skeem, supra note 72, at 495 (“the most controversial applications” for risk 
assessments “involve front-end sentences that judges impose”). 
138  See Monahan and Skeem, supra note 72, at 496; S. 2123 – 114th Congress (2015-2016): Sentencing 
Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2123. (accessed: 
December 25, 2017) 
139  An Overview of the Federal Post Conviction Risk Assessment, supra note 111, at 1. 
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that correlate with race.140  Further, basing outcomes on aggregated data may violate 
fundamental norms of fairness.141  Risk categorizations that result from these systems are 
based, at least partially, on previous independent decisions and conduct by other people, 
whose actions are beyond the offender’s control.   
During a 2014 speech in Pennsylvania, then Attorney General Eric Holder discussed 
the increasing use of aggregate data tools in many fields, and spoke favorably of assessments 
in criminal justice.  In particular, Holder noted the utility of evidence-based strategies to 
improve corrections and reduce recidivism, including by “better matching services with 
needs; by providing early warnings whenever supervised individuals stray from their reentry 
plans; by incorporating faster responses from probation officers to get people back on track; 
and by yielding feedback and results in real-time.”142  However, Holder expressed 
reservations about using risk assessments in front-end sentencing.  Instead, he stated, 
“[c]riminal sentences must be based on the facts, the law, the actual crimes committed, the 
circumstances surrounding each individual case, and the defendant’s history of criminal 
conduct.  They should not be based on unchangeable factors that a person cannot control, or 
on the possibility of a future crime that has not taken place.”143 
The argument that sentences should not be based on “the possibility of a future crime 
that has not taken place” is in tension (although not direct conflict) with the legislative 
mandate that judges must base sentences on the need “to protect the public from further 
crimes of the defendant.”144  This tension has been amplified in terrorism cases, especially in 
many of the recent prosecutions based on charges of material support for terrorism.  The 
material support statutes are widely interpreted as serving a preemptive purpose, at least in 
part.  Former Attorney General Eric Holder emphasized the importance of material support 
                                                 
140  See Moving Beyond Money, supra note 101, at 22. 
141  See id. at 22-23. 
142  See Eric Holder, Remarks at the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 57th Annual 
Meeting, supra note 89.   
143  Id. (emphasis in original). 
144  See id; 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(C). 
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laws as measures to police the threat of terrorism and “criminalize the preparatory acts 
committed by those with terrorist plans.”145   
In U.S. v. Shelton Thomas Bell, the defendant was charged with counts of attempt and 
conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, both under 18 U.S.C. 2339A.  In his 
Sentencing Order in Bell, U.S. District Judge Timothy Corrigan noted: 
 
…unlike other crimes, where, in a close case, the Court might give the benefit of the 
doubt to a seemingly remorseful defendant, terrorism-related crimes are different. 
Terrorism endangers the lives and property of the public at large, seeks to weaken or 
destroy societal institutions, and tries to spread as much fear and panic as possible…. 
the need to protect the public from further crimes of this defendant remains an 
important consideration.146   
 
Similarly, Judge Gerald Bruce Lee of U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
noted in a panel discussion about terrorism sentencing that judges consider “forecasting” an 
important component of sentencing decisions, explaining this thought process as follows: 
 
What will the future be when this person comes back home?  Is he or she going to 
pose a risk or a danger to the public? … Reading about it is not the same as sitting 
there and seeing it and trying to decide, well, if this person is fifty years old, are they 
likely to come out and try to shoot up the Holocaust Museum?  Are they likely to try 
to blow up [the] Metro?147 
 
                                                 
145  Robert Chesney, Exporting the Preventive Prosecution Model: AG Holder on Countering the Syrian 
Foreign Fighter Threat, LAWFARE (July 8, 2014), https://www.lawfareblog.com/exporting-preemptive-
prosecution-model-ag-holder-countering-syrian-foreign-fighter-threat (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
(reproducing remarks by Eric Holder in Oslo). 
146  Sentencing Order, U.S. v. Shelton Thomas Bell, 3:13-cr-00141-TJC-JRK (M.D. Fl. Jan. 14, 2015),  
Document 91, 39, https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/2602.pdf (accessed: December 25, 
2017) (emphasis added).  
147  See Baltes, note 43 supra, at 353. 
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Judge Lee later added that, in terrorism cases, “the risk of recidivism and protection of the 
public are very, very powerful considerations, and that depends on the evidence, that’s 
evidence-based, and that’s fact-driven.”148 
Judges have made clear that, when imposing sentences for terrorism offenses such as 
material support crimes, they devote substantial effort – and assign substantial weight – to 
determinations about the defendant’s likelihood of committing future violent acts.  
Facilitating a process where judges could benefit from existing expertise on violent extremism 
risk assessments would provide greater structure to the sentencing process and make 
outcomes more evidence-based.  Like the recommendations in presentence reports, the 
assessment results would not be binding upon courts or mandate particular sentences, but 
would factor into the judges’ consideration of the § 3553 factors.  Material support offenses 
cover a wide range of conduct and culpability.  The sentencing range is correspondingly wide, 
with no mandatory minimum, and a maximum prison sentence of 20 years per count (or life 
imprisonment, if a death resulted from the offense).  Against this backdrop, federal agencies 
should conduct data-driven study and consider establishing policies to include risk and needs 
assessments in terrorism cases at sentencing and other stages of the correctional process, so 
that judges will have the fullest possible toolkit to address the cases before them.   
Some of the risk assessment instruments in use for sentencing at the state level are 
commercial products, and some have been developed for particular jurisdictions.  One study 
identified 19 validated risk assessment instruments being used (or recently used) in 
correctional settings in the U.S.149  However, these instruments were not designed to assess 
the likelihood of specific offenses150; further,  as Professor Andrew Silke observed, “[t]here is 
generally good recognition that standard risk assessment tools do not work well with terrorists 
and extremists.”151  Factors considered significant for assessing terrorism risk generally 
cluster around the following:  ideology (despite popular perceptions, this is not necessarily the 
                                                 
148  Id. at 370. 
149  Desmarais and Singh, supra note 74, at 9.   
150  See ibid. 
151  See Andrew Silke, Terrorists, Extremists and Prison: An Introduction to the Critical Issues, in PRISONS, 
TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM 9 (Andrew Silke ed., Routledge 2014). 
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most significant factor), capability, affiliations, political and social environment, 
disengagement factors, behavior in custody, and emotional factors.152  In recent years, new 
risk assessment measures have been developed specifically for the context of violent 
extremism, including the Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA-2 and VERA-2R, 
originally developed in 2009) and the Extremism Risk Guidance (ERG 22+, launched in 
2011).  The VERA-2 is in use for terrorist prisoners in Australia, while the ERG 22+ is in use 
for terrorist prisoners in England and Wales.153  The VERA-2 and ERG 22+ are similar in the 
factors they consider.  The VERA-2 assesses individuals based on 31 factors, including six 
protective factors.  The ERG 22+ assesses offenders on 22 factors, and is designed so that 
other factors may be considered as well if they have a demonstrated relevance to a particular 
case.154  A small-scale study supported the use of VERA-2 for risk assessment, while the ERG 
instrument’s authors have called the factors “working hypotheses,” as the link with recidivism 
has not yet been proven.155  The models are likely to evolve as more data and substantive 
evaluations become available.156  The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism at the 
Hague (ICCT) is also developing a comprehensive risk assessment tool.   
Federal judicial agencies should study these instruments and determine whether an 
instrument customized for the U.S. federal judicial system would be beneficial.  Another 
option is to rely on a structured professional judgment model, such as the consultations that 
leading expert Daniel Koehler, and the German Institute for Radicalization and 
Deradicalization Studies (GIRDS), provided to the District Court of Minnesota in 2016.  In 
addition to administering evaluations, Koehler trained officers from the district’s Office of 
Pretrial and Probation Services to administer the assessments themselves.  The Minnesota 
ISIS trials and the emerging issues they highlight for terrorism jurisprudence on a national 
scale are explored further in Parts III and IV. 
                                                 
152  See Andrew Silke, Risk Assessment of Terrorist and Extremist Prisoners, in PRISONS, TERRORISM AND 
EXTREMISM 113 (Andrew Silke ed., Routledge 2014). 
153  Id. at 117.  See also Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, supra note 52, at 50:1-11 (referencing ERG-22+ 
and Canadian evaluation methodologies). 
154  See Silke, supra note 152, at 118.   
155  See ibid. (internal reference omitted).   
156  See ibid. 
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III. Forging New Pathways in Terrorism Cases 
 
An Overview of the Minnesota ISIS Cases 
In April 2015, Andrew Luger, then U.S. Attorney for Minnesota, announced the 
arrests of six young men from Minnesota’s Somali-American community for trying to join 
ISIS in Syria, following a ten-month investigation.157  The investigation focused on a network 
of individuals who aspired to follow in the footsteps of Abdi Nur, a common friend to the 
group who had successfully reached Syria and fought with ISIS, and who currently is believed 
dead.158  Three other associates of the group had been charged previously.  One of the 
previously charged individuals, Abdullahi Yusuf, was an 18-year old high school student 
when he first drew authorities’ attention; Yusuf provided suspicious answers to a passport 
specialist while applying for an expedited passport.159  Following his eventual arrest in 
November 2014, Yusuf pleaded guilty and was released to a halfway house as part of an 
experimental approach to disengagement and deradicalization.  Ultimately, of the nine 
defendants remaining in the United States, six pleaded guilty to material support charges.  The 
other three defendants (Guled Ali Omar, Abdirahman Yasin Daud, and Mohamed Abdihamid 
Farah) were convicted at trial of both material support offenses and conspiracy to commit 
murder overseas.160 
 
                                                 
157  See, e.g., Scott Shane, 6 Minnesotans Held in Plot to Join ISIS, NEW YORK TIMES (April 20, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/21/us/6-somali-americans-arrested-in-isis-recruiting-case.html?_r=0 
(accessed: December 25, 2017).  The men arrested and their ages at the time of arrest were: Zacharia Yusuf 
Abdurahman, 19; Adnan Farah, 19; Hanad Mustafe Musse, 19; Guled Ali Omar, 20; Abdirahman Yasin Daud, 
21; and Mohamed Abdihamid Farah, 21 (Adnan Farah’s brother). Other friends charged in the same conspiracy 
included Abdullahi Yusuf, Abdirizak Warsame, and Hamza Naj Ahmed; and Abdi Nur was charged in absentia 
with joining ISIS in Syria.  See Counter Extremism Project website, Abdiwali Nur: Overview,  
https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/abdiwali-nur. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
158  Counter Extremism Project, https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/abdiwali-nur. 
159  See Andrew Grossman, Ben Kesling, and Tamara Audi, U.S. Charges Six Minnesota Men with Trying 
to Join ISIS, WALL STREET JOURNAL (April 20, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/terrorism-probe-yields-six-
arrests-u-s-authorities-say-1429518994. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
160  See Steve Karnowski, German Expert Details Efforts to De-Radicalize 6 Somali Defendants, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.twincities.com/2016/09/20/german-expert-details-efforts-to-de-
redicalize-6-somali-defendants/. (accessed: December 25, 2017)   
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In March of 2016, as prosecutions for conspiracy to join ISIS proceeded against the 
nine defendants, Judge Michael Davis of the federal District of Minnesota launched the 
district court’s new Terrorism Disengagement and Deradicalization Program (TDDP).  U.S. 
Attorney Andrew Luger supported the initiative, calling it “one important step to address 
terror recruiting.”161  The program’s objectives are: (1) to provide information to the Court 
that is otherwise not available to it as a basis for sentencing defendants convicted of a 
terrorism offenses; (2) to provide purposeful pre-trial and post-incarceration supervision that 
ensures public safety by monitoring defendants to verify that they have not reverted to any 
involvement with terroristic activities; and (3) to further the process of disengagement and 
deradicalization from extremist ideology while rehabilitating offenders to become successful, 
law-abiding citizens.162  Upon the TDDP’s inception, the court enlisted Daniel Koehler of 
GIRDS to provide evaluations on specific cases, to train staff, and to provide ongoing 
consultations and services.  
During a hearing related to these evaluations in the ISIS litigation, Judge Davis 
recounted that the need for this program materialized years ago, when the court was 
adjudicating al-Shabaab cases.  Judge Davis noted that the court lacked sufficient information 
for sentencing defendants, in that a necessary component was missing.163  Subsequently, 
Judge Davis turned to the TDDP program in the 2016 cases of the accused ISIS conspirators, 
pioneering the use of specialized risk and needs assessments for offenders convicted on 
terrorism charges.164  Initially, Judge Davis ordered that four defendants who had pleaded 
guilty by early March 2016 submit to presentence examinations and studies “to evaluate risk 
assessment and recommended intervention needs for de-radicalization of defendants involved 
in terrorism related cases.”  The court ordered the U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services Office 
                                                 
161  Amy Forliti, Federal Court in Minnesota Creates Deradicalization Program, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(March 3, 2016), https://apnews.com/c48c6df80d8c4ed2b18decfec62fb9af/judge-study-willrecommend-
deradicalization-plans-4-men. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
162  U.S. DIST. CT., DISTRICT OF MINN., Terrorism Disengagement and Deradicalization Program, two-
page document supplied to the author by Judge Michael J. Davis’s Judicial Assistant.  
163  See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, supra note 52, at 11:7-15, 21-22. 
164  See id. at 27:8-17 (Koehler provided a more limited evaluation, at the request of a parent, for the 
defense attorneys in a California case prior to his work in the Minnesota ISIS cases).   
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for the District of Minnesota to coordinate the study, and to contract with Koehler to prepare a 
written report with findings and recommendations that would be helpful to the Court at 
sentencing.165  The court’s orders specified that Koehler should base his risk assessment on 
recognized, structured professional judgment assessment tools.   
Daniel Koehler completed the assessment reports for the four defendants as originally 
ordered, as well as for two additional defendants who pled guilty subsequently.  In addition, 
Koehler trained a select group of officers from the Probation and Pretrial Services Office to 
coordinate programs for disengagement and deradicalization, assess their impact, and build 
strong community partnerships to facilitate success.166  The assessment reports were attached 
as addenda to the preliminary presentence investigation reports and distributed to defendants’ 
attorneys.167  Defendants had the opportunity to object to the evaluations, but none did so.168  
In fact, two of the defendants who were convicted at trial, Abdirahman Daud and Guled 
Omar, later requested the opportunity to be assessed by Koehler as well.  The court denied 
these motions, finding that Koehler’s training of court personnel obviated the need for 
Koehler personally to conduct the evaluations. 
At an evidentiary hearing in late September 2016, Daniel Koehler testified at length 
about his assessment methodology.  Each report answered three main questions.  First, 
Koehler considered what factors contributed to each defendant’s radicalization, leading him to 
aspire to join ISIS.  Second, Koehler provided a “risk or radicalization stage assessment,” 
considering the individual’s existing degree of radicalization and risk of recidivism.  Third, 
Koehler provided recommendations for mentoring and counseling programs to help each 
                                                 
165  See, e.g., Order, United States v. Yusuf (D. Minn. Mar. 2, 2016) (Crim. No. 15-46); Order, United 
States v. Abdurahman (D. Minn. Mar. 2, 2016) (Crim. No. 15-49 (05); see also, Order, U.S. v. Ahmed (Oct. 5, 
2016) (Crim. No. 15-49) 
http://www.leagle.com/decision/In%20FDCO%2020161006F21/U.S.%20v.%20Ahmed. (accessed: December 
25, 2017) 
166  See Daniel Koehler, The NYC Bombing Highlights Our Urgent Need for Deradicalization Programs, 
THE WORLD POST (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/nyc-bombing-deradicalization-
programs_us_57e00bfee4b04a1497b5a1d5 (accessed: December 25, 2017); Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, 
supra note 52, at 11:7-11. 
167  See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, supra note 52, at 7:23-25.   
168  See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, supra note 52, at 7:16-23.   
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individual disengage and deradicalize.169  For each defendant, Koehler’s report included a risk 
assessment level; as to the first four assessed, Abdullahi Yusuf was assessed as medium to 
low risk, Zacharia Abdurahman and Hamza Ahmed were medium to high risk, and Abdirizak 
Warsame was high risk.170    
Koehler arrived at those conclusions utilizing a qualitative approach which began with 
substantial information gathering.171  He conducted qualitative narrative and semi-structured 
interviews with the defendants themselves, their families, and other persons of interest who 
interacted with the defendants, such as religious leaders.  He reviewed documents provided by 
the court, as well as open source information including media reports.  For each individual 
evaluated, Koehler endeavored to ascertain what driving factors (i.e., theological, ideological, 
or other factors) motivated them to embrace violent extremism.  Further, he assessed where 
the individuals stood at the time of assessment with respect to rejecting the violent ideology 
and/or distancing themselves from the conspiracy, and whether they exhibited cognitive 
openings whereby a counselor, mentor, or coordinator could identify a route to facilitate their 
exit from violent extremism.172   
Daniel Koehler’s methodology relies upon structured professional judgment, rather 
than a purely actuarial or purely clinical method.  Indeed, the court’s orders for the 
assessments specify that Koehler should use “recognized, structured professional judgment 
assessment tools.”173  Koehler does not administer actuarial assessment protocols like the 
VERA-2 or ERG-22, but incorporates elements from those tools into his evaluations.174  
During his testimony, Koehler explained that the structured assessment protocols rely upon a 
mathematical formula to produce a numerical risk assessment output, but provide insufficient 
                                                 
169  See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, supra note 52, at 46:24-47:12. 
170  See Radicalization Expert Testifies About Minnesota Terror Suspects’ Review, KSTP/ABC EYEWITNESS 
NEWS, http://www.wdaz.com/news/4119771-radicalization-expert-testifies-about-minnesota-terror-suspects-
review (accessed: December 25, 2017). 
171  See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, supra note 52, at 47:13-15. 
172  See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, supra note 52, at 48:14-24. 
173  See Order, United States v. Warsame (D. Minn. Mar. 2, 2016) (Crim. No. 16-37), 
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/Warsame%20Order%2C%203-2-16.pdf. (accessed: 
December 25, 2017) 
174  See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, supra note 52, at 49:1-20, 52:24-53:4. 
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information for why and how an individual moved toward violent extremism.  A numerical 
estimate of the likelihood of committing a violent act does not provide counselors with 
necessary information about how to help the person exit from violent extremism, nor an 
understanding of the best approach for disengagement and deradicalization of that 
individual.175  The actuarial assessment instruments, in other words, do not sufficiently 
incorporate the needs and responsivity principles of a risk-needs-responsivity model.176   
Judge Davis indicated implicit agreement with Koehler’s qualitative, structured 
professional judgment approach, noting that the district alternatively could have contracted 
with an expert from Canada to administer the ERG-22, a structured assessment protocol.  But 
citing the decision in the Shelton Thomas Bell case, Judge Davis described the role of judges 
in terrorism cases as “trying to find out who an individual defendant is, and that’s what you 
do in helping them, if you can, dealing with the issues of de-radicalization.”177   
The judge indicated that the evaluation report likely would serve as one factor in his 
sentencing determinations, but would not take on overwhelming significance relative to other 
considerations.178  To arrive at sentencing determinations, Judge Davis calculated the advisory 
range under the Sentencing Guidelines, including the terrorism enhancement, as well as any 
applicable downward departures such as motions under §5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines 
for providing substantial assistance to the government.  The judge also considered the 
required factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and took into account sentencing decisions in 
comparable terrorism cases.   
In a pattern used in criminal prosecutions outside the terrorism context, the court also 
appeared to base sentencing decisions partially upon defendants’ degree acceptance of 
responsibility and cooperation with law enforcement.  Some of the defendants, including 
Abdullahi Yusuf and Abdirizak Warsame, pleaded guilty and cooperated, even agreeing to 
                                                 
175  See ibid. 
176  See discussion, supra, part II. 
177  See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, supra note 52, at 50:12-17.  
178  See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, supra note 52, at 282:23-283:8 (Judge Davis indicated, “This is just 
a small portion of how I’m going to – the factors I’m going to be using for sentencing… This is not that large of 
a factor, if it is a factor at all, in my sentencing”).  
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testify against their co-conspirators.  Yusuf was sentenced to time served, a period of up to 
365 days in a residential reentry center (or halfway house) with electronic monitoring, and 20 
years of supervised release.179  Judge Davis also handed down a relatively light sentence (for 
an ISIS-related case) to Mr. Warsame, who received two and a half years in prison followed 
by 20 years supervised release.  In a second category, four defendants – Hanad Musse, 
Zacharia Abdurahman, Adnan Farah, and Hamza Ahmed – pleaded guilty but did not 
cooperate with the government.180  Musse, Abdurahman, and Farah were each sentenced to 10 
years imprisonment, and 20 years of supervised release.181  Hamza Ahmed received a 15-year 
sentence.  In the final category, three defendants – Mohamed Farah, Abdirahman Daud, and 
Guled Omar – pleaded not guilty and were convicted at trial.  These defendants, who were 
also charged with additional offenses, received the longest sentences of 30 years 
imprisonment each, along with lifetime supervised release for Farah and Daud and 35 years 
for Guled Omar.  Karen Greenberg, Director of the Center on National Security at Fordham 
University School of Law, noted that these sentencing gradations reflected added nuance in 
terrorism jurisprudence that brought the cases more in line with other criminal 
prosecutions.182  
Judge Davis stated in Abdullahi Yusuf’s sentencing hearing that, “any act of terrorism 
represents a particularly grave threat because of the dangerousness of the crime and the 
difficulty of deterring and rehabilitating the criminal.  And thus, terrorists and their supporters 
should be incapacitated for a long period of time.”183  And yet, Davis imposed a varied range 
                                                 
179  Sentencing Hearing Transcript, United States v. Yusuf, 0:15-cr-00046-MJD, Document 104, 39: 15-18, 
43:5-9 (Nov. 23, 2016).  
180  See Sentencing Hearing Transcript, United States v. Musse, 0:15-cr-00049-MJD-FLN, Document 764 
(Nov. 15, 2016) , at 15, 16-21, 17-25; Tracy Connor, Sentences in Minnesota ISIS Case Run from Time Served to 
35 Years, NBC NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/sentences-minnesota-isis-case-
run-time-served-35-years-n685011. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
181  See id. 
182  See Connor, supra note 180. 
183  Sentencing Hearing Transcript, United States v. Yusuf, supra note 179, at 38:25-39:7; see also, United 
States v. Meskini, 319 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Congress and the Sentencing Commission had a rational basis 
for concluding that an act of terrorism represents a particularly grave threat because of the dangerousness of the 
crime and the difficulty of deterring and rehabilitating the criminal, and thus that terrorists and their supporters 
should be incapacitated for a longer period of time”).   
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of sentences spanning from time served at the low end, to 35 years imprisonment at the high 
end.  Many fact-based considerations, as outlined above, allowed Judge Davis to reach these 
sentencing gradations, but among the most novel and noteworthy factors were the assessments 
that Daniel Koehler administered.  Mr. Koehler acknowledged that “[t]here’s no 100 percent 
guarantee that these intervention methods actually work.”  However, he noted, “it’s better 
than working blindfolded without any kind of assessment or structure or protocol.”184  Judge 
Davis likewise noted that, in establishing the program for disengagement and deradicalization, 
the district was “being proactive in trying to protect and serve the community.”185   
 
The Way Forward: Broadening the Minnesota Approach 
Judge Michael Davis has advanced the state of terrorism jurisprudence in the United 
States by identifying and articulating the needs for: (1) methods for courts to obtain 
supplemental, expert information to assist in the process of sentencing terrorism defendants; 
and (2) programs for rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders in the 
federal judicial and corrections systems.  While the District of Minnesota is proactively 
addressing these needs within its own jurisdiction, federal terrorism investigations have been 
initiated in all 50 states.  All districts should be prepared to handle the post-conviction 
environment in terrorism cases with approaches that reflect state of the art expertise and duly 
considered policy choices.   
Researching and potentially implementing post-conviction policies and procedures for 
terrorism prevention within the federal justice system requires a substantial commitment from 
federal policymakers.  A comprehensive, data-driven study of rehabilitation and reintegration 
programs globally is a crucial first step.  Judicial agencies could draw upon previous work 
that surveys existing programs and categorizes them by typology and methodology186, while 
                                                 
184  See Forliti, supra note 161 
185  See id.   
186  See, e.g., DANIEL KOEHLER, UNDERSTANDING DERADICALIZATION: METHODS, TOOLS AND PROGRAMS 
FOR COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (Routledge 2017). 
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convening expert working groups to assist in framing the analysis in the manner most 
expedient for the U.S. justice system.  
Officials should then channel their findings into several policy determinations.  The 
threshold determination is whether to implement uniform, post-conviction procedures for risk 
reduction in the sentencing, incarceration, or post-release realms of terrorism cases.  The 
Minnesota TDDP initiative described in Part III, supra, aims to encompass all three 
contexts.187  Practitioners often view programming in these realms as interrelated; for 
example, reintegration after prison is a core component of the well-known Saudi approach to 
rehabilitation.188  Yet developing policy approaches in each arena will face different logistical 
hurdles.  In particular, the level and availability of needed funding and other resources 
impacts preferred approaches across different institutions.  For example, in Minnesota, the 
District Court has implemented sentencing evaluations as one component of its broad new 
initiative, but it is unclear whether the Federal Bureau of Prisons will arrange for the new 
program to work with inmates.189  Further, recruiting counselors and mentors for involvement 
in terrorism cases has proven challenging for the Probation and Pretrial Services Office for 
the District of Minnesota.190 
Federal policymakers also should identify the goals, preferred methodology, and 
metrics for success for any new risk reduction processes or programming.  For post-
conviction programs focused on preventing recidivism, officials should consider whether 
empirical evidence supports goals encompassing disengagement (cessation of violent actions 
and affiliations) or deradicalization (renunciation of belief in violent ideology).191  This 
                                                 
187  See, e.g., Brandan I. Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist Back Into a Citizen? WIRED (Jan. 24, 2017), 
https://www.wired.com/2017/01/can-you-turn-terrorist-back-into-citizen/. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
188  See, e.g., Laura Mallonee, Step Inside a Saudi Rehab Prison for Jihadists, WIRED (March 31, 2017) 
(“The government even helps prisoners find wives, buy cars, and land a job”), 
https://www.wired.com/2017/03/david-degner-jihad-rehab/ (accessed: December 25, 2017). 
189  See Koerner, supra note 187. 
190  See id. 
191  See, e.g., Mary Beth Altier, Emma Leonard Boyle, Neil D. Shortland & John G. Horgan, Why They 
Leave: An Analysis of Terrorist Disengagement Events from Eight-seven Autobiographical Accounts, 26 
SECURITY STUDIES (Iss. 2, March 2, 2017), 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2017.1280307. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
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question implicates not only empirical but also constitutional considerations.192  When 
considering pre-sentencing risk evaluations specifically, officials should study the existing 
risk assessment protocols, available data, and precedent in U.S. courts to determine whether: 
(1) the development of a new, structured or actuarial risk and needs assessment protocol is 
warranted, customized for violent extremist offenders in the U.S. court system; (2) an existing 
protocol developed for violent extremist offenders, such as the ERG-22+ or VERA-2, should 
be adopted; or (3) a structured professional judgment model, such as that employed by Daniel 
Koehler in the District of Minnesota, should be incorporated.   
Those agencies which conceivably could effect valuable contributions to advancing 
post-conviction risk reduction strategies for violent extremist offenders include the United 
States Sentencing Commission, the Administrative Office for the U.S. Courts, the Bureau of 
Prisons, and the Federal Judicial Center. These agencies could leverage existing infrastructure 
and expertise to research issues relating to sentencing, rehabilitation, and reintegration for 
violent extremist offenders.  Even if every federal district theoretically could secure resources 
to hire experts like Daniel Koehler to help design programs and train probation officers as the 
need arises, those officers will eventually retire and others will replace them.  Additionally, 
unwarranted disparities would arise across districts.  A more sustainable and consistent model 
would be one based upon central policy decisions supported by purposeful research and 
decision-making.   
 The U.S. Sentencing Commission is an independent agency in the judicial branch, 
which describes its principal purposes as follows: 
(1) to establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal courts, 
including guidelines to be consulted regarding the appropriate form and 
severity of punishment for offenders convicted of federal crimes; (2) to advise 
and assist Congress and the executive branch in the development of effective 
                                                 
192  See, e.g., Berkell, supra note 21, at 6, 18 (“Critics express concern that CVE guidelines may violate 
constitutional norms by rendering suspect political and religious expression protected under the First 
Amendment”) (internal citations omitted), 29. 
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and efficient crime policy; and (3) to collect, analyze, research, and distribute a 
broad array of information on federal crime and sentencing issues….193 
 
The Sentencing Commission is well-positioned to study and report on the sentencing of 
terrorist offenders, and the potential for risk assessment instruments to aid in this process. 
In addition to risk assessment instruments, another possible option to minimize 
disparities and use evidence to guide the sentencing process, would be a statutory amendment 
that would build more gradations into the material support laws themselves. In addition to 
incorporating formal assessment results into sentencing decisions, Congress could consider 
adding greater nuance into the penalties enumerated in the underlying statutes.  The material 
support statutes already permit the imposition of longer sentences in instances in which the 
death of any person results from the offense; other sentencing gradations could be codified as 
well.  The Sentencing Commission could consider this option, of using factors that would 
affect the outcome of a risk and needs assessment instead to shape sentencing outcomes more 
directly through the criminal code.  However, because such provisions would tend to reduce 
judicial discretion in handling unique cases and fact patterns, risk assessments that leave 
judicial discretion intact while providing moderately structured information may provide 
preferable tools to inform sentencing decisions for violent extremist offenders. 
In 2015, the Chief of the National Program Development Division at the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Probation and Pretrial Services Office, wrote that 
the federal justice system has “articulated the system’s goals in national policies, promoted a 
common understanding of those goals, operationalized measures that speak directly to those 
goals, and built an infrastructure that promotes systematic measurement of results.”194  In light 
of the overlap of terrorism prosecutions with national security policy, the Administrative 
Office could articulate the goals and policies of the federal justice system with respect to 
those individuals accused and convicted of terrorism-related offenses, including policies with 
                                                 
193  United States Sentencing Commission website, www.ussc.gov/about-page (accessed: December 25, 
2017), Mission.  
194  See Baber, supra note 112, at 4 (internal citation omitted).   
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respect to the implementation of formal risk reduction programs.  In connection with the 
sentencing environment, the Sentencing Commission and Administrative Office could jointly 
study the possible development of an actuarial tool, and/or the issuance of policies supporting 
a structured professional judgment approach such as the one employed by Daniel Koehler.  
Finally, the Administrative Office could train probation officers regarding the administration 
of any approved assessment instrument, perhaps in a scaled down version of training provided 
in connection with the Post Conviction Risk Assessment (see discussion in Part II, supra). 
The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) is the research and education agency of the U.S. 
government’s judicial branch.  The FJC conducts research and issues reports on judiciary 
activities, including case management and court administration.  With the Administrative 
Office, the FJC maintains a public database of federal cases.  Additionally, the FJC educates 
federal judges and judiciary staff on law, case management, leadership, ethics, and court 
administration.195  The FJC, working in conjunction with the Administrative Office and other 
agencies, could play a valuable role in educating judges and judiciary staff in state-of-the-art 
national and international approaches to countering and preventing violent extremism, so that 
court personnel are fully aware of the range of options and best practices, if and when 
terrorist-related offenses are prosecuted in their districts. 
Finally, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is the federal agency responsible for the custody 
and care of federal inmates.  It is the BOP’s responsibility to “ensure the security of federal 
prisons and provide inmates with programs and services that model mainstream values.”196  
While integrating research and expertise from other agencies, the BOP would be the lead 
implementer of any federal programs for disengagement and deradicalization of inmates in 
the federal prison system.  A critical determination concerning in-prison programs is how to 
model coordination with independent service providers and outside contractors to achieve 
maximum efficiency and beneficial impact.197  
                                                 
195  See Federal Judicial Center website, https://www.fjc.gov/. (accessed: December 25, 2017) 
196  See Federal Bureau of Prisons website, https://www.bop.gov/about/agency/. (accessed: December 25, 
2017) 
197  See Tony C. Parker, Establishing a Deradicalization/Disengagement Model for America’s Correctional 
Facilities: Recommendations for Countering Prison Radicalization, CALHOUN: INSTITUTIONAL ARCHIVE OF THE 
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IV. Prison and Reentry Programs 
 
A detailed exploration of the status of, and potential for, in-prison rehabilitation and 
reintegration programs across federal districts (or in state penitentiaries) is beyond the scope 
of this article.  However, the absence of such programming for violent extremist offenders in 
the federal justice system is worth noting here.  The Bureau of Prisons currently administers 
no substantial, publicly known programs for disengagement and deradicalization of prisoners 
convicted of violent extremist crimes.198  
Judges in recent terrorism prosecutions have noted the absence of such programming.  
For example, in sentencing defendant Shelton Thomas Bell to 20 years in prison after he 
pleaded guilty to attempt and conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, District 
Judge Timothy Corrigan commented on the possibility of Bell’s rehabilitation.  While expert 
testimony suggested there was “little reason to believe” the threat posed by defendant “could 
ever be extinguished short of permanent incapacitation,” Judge Corrigan felt Bell’s apparent 
remorse provided “some hope that counseling component to [the defendant’s] incarceration 
could have a positive effect."199  The court observed that the defendant could be “counseled 
while in prison, and in the years to come, one would expect more comprehensive methods for 
rehabilitating would-be terrorists will be developed.”200   
Testimony in the ISIS cases described in Part III, supra, and comments there by Judge 
Davis, also shed light on the lack of specialized programming available in the federal prison 
system.  Kevin Lowry, Chief Probation and Pretrial Services Officer for the District of 
                                                                                                                                                        
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, 77 (March 2013) (“U.S. Corrections should invest in an intensive effort to 
recruit properly vetted and trained volunteers, chaplains, and psychological professionals that would be utilized 
in an established counseling program….”), 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32881/13Mar_Parker_Tony.pdf?sequence=1. (accessed: 
December 25, 2017) 
198  See Sentencing Order, U.S. v. Shelton Thomas Bell, supra note 146, at 27; Doualy Xaykaothao, Judge 
Allows ISIS Conspirator to Remain Out of Prison, MPR NEWS (May 9, 2017), 
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2017/05/09/judge-allows-isis-conspirator-yusuf-to-remain-out-of-prison 
(accessed: December 25, 2017) (quoting Judge Michael Davis).   
199  See Sentencing Order, U.S. v. Shelton Thomas Bell, supra note 146, at 29. 
200  See id. at 39-40 (emphasis added). 
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Minnesota, testified that the district has 35 to 40 different contract and treatment service 
providers.  When Mr. Lowry and Judge Davis canvassed the country, Lowry testified that: 
 
[we] did not find any other criminal justice agencies, counties, states or 
nongovernmental agencies that had this type of [disengagement and deradicalization] 
programming, so we looked to nine different programs internationally … we are in the 
infancy of building a program, so we have a number of treatment providers that were 
trained and we’re putting online and number of other treatment activities that we’ve 
put together.201 
 
Mr. Lowry further testified that if Abdullahi Yusuf (one of the nine defendants in the recent 
ISIS-related conspiracy) was sentenced to a prison term, Yusuf would be assessed and 
designated through a central office in Texas.  Thereafter, Yusuf probably would be sent to a 
high risk institution somewhere in the county based on his conviction for a terrorist offense, 
likely far removed from the Minneapolis community.  Mr. Lowry testified that any general 
programming that the U.S. Bureau of Prisons has available for terrorism offenders does not 
meet the same standards as the “evaluative or assessment process or treatment modalities” 
that Minnesota is developing.  In a subsequent hearing after Mr. Yusuf violated the terms of 
his supervised release by watching a CNN documentary in May 2017, Judge Davis once again 
noted the absence of any violent extremist rehabilitation programming in prison, stating, “I 
don’t have a [terrorist rehabilitation] program.  So we are working together to make you well.  
But if there is a misstep, my only alternative is to send you to prison.”202 
 Despite the absence of programming in the United States, numerous programs for in-
prison rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders exist globally.  In 
accordance with Kevin Lowry’s above-referenced testimony, any efforts by U.S. corrections 
officials to develop such programming should commence with a review of existing programs 
at the international level.  For example, Saudi Arabia in particular has garnered extensive 
                                                 
201  See Sentencing Hearing Transcript, United States v. Yusuf, supra note 179, at 33. 
202  See Xaykaothao, supra note 198.  
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international attention for its well-funded and relatively long-running deradicalization 
initiative.203  While certain aspects of the Saudi program – such as its religious reeducation 
component – would not be culturally viable nor constitutionally permissible in the United 
States, other elements of the program warrant further evaluation.  These latter elements 
include enlisting family support, and robust post-release reintegration and follow-up 
efforts.204  Together with the Administrative Office for the U.S. Courts and the Office of 
Probation and Pretrial Services (perhaps including representatives from individual district 
offices of probation and pretrial services), the Bureau of Prisons should study possible options 
for in-prison programming and report on those most viable within the jurisdiction of the U.S. 
federal prison system.   
 
Andrew Silke has written that:  
 
Our understanding of terrorists and extremists in prison is surprisingly limited.  Given 
the scale of writing and research on terrorism over recent decades…it is surprising 
then to see how little has focused on prison issues.  This is particularly unexpected 
because eventually most terrorists will end up in prison.  What happens within the 
prison walls, however, has been largely overlooked for a very long time.205 
 
The U.S. population of imprisoned terrorist offenders constitutes only a tiny fraction 
of the general prison population in the U.S.  Notwithstanding its relatively small size, the 
future of this population is linked with high stakes for individuals, communities, and national 
security policy.  Accordingly, research into the evidence base for development of programs 
within the correctional system for rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist 
offenders would constitute a worthwhile investment.   
 
                                                 
203  See Berkell, supra note 21, at 29; Mallonee, supra note 188. 
204  See id. at 30-31. 
205  See Silke, supra note 151, at 5. 
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Conclusion 
 
Opportunities to prevent terrorism by countering violent extremism arise across many 
different segments of society, including in the post-conviction areas of the criminal justice 
system.  The federal government should supplement laws that punish terrorist acts in the short 
term with policies that counter and prevent violent extremism in the long term.  These efforts 
may include developing and implementing evidence-based, systematic measures to assess and 
reduce the risk that convicted terrorist offenders will reoffend.  Specialized risk and needs 
assessments, as well as rehabilitation and reintegration programming, constitute possible 
measures.  Yet the relevant federal agencies have not released findings or publicly advanced 
policies on the pressing issues that increasingly confront judicial and corrections officials in 
sentencing and supervising those convicted of terrorist offenses.   While the number of 
offenders in terrorism cases is miniscule as compared with the population of criminal 
offenders overall in the United States, terrorist crimes have broad implications for society and 
national security policy, thus supporting the development of policy and evidence-based 
practices.  
Federal district judges may continue to forge their own pathways in sentencing 
terrorism defendants and assessing defendants’ potential for rehabilitation, and districts may 
develop community-based programs to assist with reintegration on an ad hoc basis.  However, 
federal agencies have developed strong infrastructure that could be applied to these issues, 
and could facilitate meaningful advancements and uniformity in the area of terrorism 
jurisprudence.  The adoption of risk assessment policies for violent extremist offenders at the 
sentencing stage and beyond, to monitor and assess offenders’ ongoing risks of recidivism, 
would insert additional information and rigor to the sentencing and corrections processes.  
Evidence-based programs to rehabilitate terrorist offenders and counter further radicalization 
in prison also could help to reduce risks of recidivism after releases from prison.  In the 
current environment, in which many perpetrators of terrorist attacks have previously appeared 
on law enforcement’s radar, it is logical for judicial officials to consider and endeavor to 
reduce the continuing commitment of these individuals to engage in violent extremist acts.  
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Such initiatives are not exclusive of more traditional approaches to sentencing and 
incarceration, but would supplement existing methods. 
As trends in crime evolve, the legislature and judicial officials develop more proactive 
and sophisticated methods of addressing them.  Because the majority of terrorist offenders 
eventually will be released back into society, and because of the high stakes of terrorist 
offenses, judicial resources are warranted to duly consider reducing the risks of recidivism.  
Much as the justice system devotes resources to other specialized rehabilitation programs 
such as those for substance abuse and gang violence, federal resources should be directed 
toward researching and establishing policies on initiatives to diminish opportunities for 
violent extremism in the post-conviction setting. 
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